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HELL IN THE SNOW: THE U.S. ARMY IN THE COLMAR POCKET,  
JANUARY 22-FEBRUARY 9,1945 
 
Clinton W. Thompson 
Thesis Chair: Matthew Stith, Ph.D. 
The University of Texas at Tyler 
September 2017 
 
In December of 1944 and January of 1945, as Allied forces fought to slowly regain their 
footing in the Battle of the Bulge, another fierce engagement raged to the south in Alsace and 
became known as the Battle of the Colmar Pocket. Although overshadowed by the more famous 
fight to the north, the Colmar Pocket nevertheless played a pivotal role in the war in Europe. Yet 
the engagement which made Audie Murphy famous remains at the periphery of our 
understanding of the intense fighting in the winter of 1944-45. This thesis is about the 
overlooked story in the Allied struggle against Germany which provides an important window 
into wartime strategy and diplomacy. This thesis also addresses the struggle the average soldier 
went through is and how they dealt with their own personal struggles. The research gathered 
included oral histories, as well as manuscripts, books, after action reports, etc., which give the 
reader a full understanding of what took place in the Colmar Pocket as the U.S. Army attempted 
to push the German Army across the Rhine River.
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Hell in the Snow: The U.S. Army in the Colmar Pocket, 
January 22-February 9, 1945 
 
 
We lost more tanks than you could shake a stick at. Dead bodies lay 
everywhere, and wounded men, and not a thing I could do about it. 
I wondered how come guys got their bodies blown apart while mine 
stayed intact, and how come guys got killed while I lived. 
 
                                                                                       Gene Palumbo1 
 
In early 1945, Allied Forces in Belgium fought against the remnants of the German Army 
who had launched a surprise attack through Ardennes Forest, which became known as The Battle 
of the Bulge. As they fought, another fierce engagement raged in Western Europe. Although 
overshadowed by the more famous fight to the north, this battle nevertheless played a pivotal 
role in the war in Europe. This was where Adolf Hitler desperately tried to hold on to the Third 
Reich’s last bit of territory in France.  The Allied leadership did not overlook this area. Gen. 
Dwight Eisenhower himself saw the importance. Eisenhower, along with SHEAF (The Supreme 
Headquarters for the Allied Expeditionary Force), viewed this 850-square-mile area along the 
Rhine as the Allies’ last major obstacle in Europe.2  
In the scope of World War II history, the Colmar Pocket has been lost in the shadow of 
The Battle of the Bulge (Fig. 1). A town since medieval Europe, Colmar is in the French region 
of Alsace along the Rhine River. In the last months of the war in Europe, as the Soviet Army 
pushed toward Berlin from the East, the United States 6th Army Group moved into the “Pocket” 
around Colmar to break through the remnants of the German 19th Army. Here, the Germans 
                                                             
1 Gene Palumbo, Load Kick Fire: Fighting with the 756th Tank Battalion, B Company, on the front lines during 
WWII (Published by the Author,2012),83. 
2 David Colley, Decision at Strasbourg: Ike’s Strategic Mistake to halt the 6th Army Group at the Rhine  
River (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008), 190. 
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made their last stand in a desperate effort to keep their last foothold in France. Many American 
soldiers who had previously fought in numerous campaigns across Africa, Italy and France, state 
plainly the nineteen days of combat to collapse the Colmar Pocket, starting on January 22, 1945, 
and lasting until February 9, 1945, was the hardest, most challenging part of their entire war 
experience, such as Frederick Kroesen when he said, “There were many other dangerous 
occasions during that war, but I never seemed to be as close proximity to danger as I had been in 
Colmar and the Siegfried Line.” 3  
 
 
Figure 1. Comparison of the Battle of the Bulge (top dotted indentation) and the Colmar 
Pocket (bottom Indentation). 
                                                             
3 Ted Ballard, “Changes in the Western Front,” Rhineland, U.S. Army Center of Military History, accessed August 
28,2017, http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/rhineland/rhineland.htm; Frederick Kroesen and Clayton R. Newell 
eds., General Thoughts: Seventy Years with the Army. Writings of General Frederick J. Kroesen, United States 
Army, Retired. (Washington: Association of the U.S. Army, 2003),11. 
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Unfortunately, there are stories that are not told. Is it acceptable this moment in world 
history be forgotten? There is already too much history being lost because of old age and death 
without being heard. This event does not need to fade away due to the passing of the Greatest 
Generation. There is a need for more written work about the subject. Most memories and 
available material are in archives and depositories that are hundreds of miles away from public 
eyes and are only assessable to the handful of people who make the trek to uncover material 
about history.  
       *  *  *  
The winter of 2016 marked the 72nd anniversary of The Battle for the Colmar Pocket.  In 
the time since the end of the war in 1945, there have been countless works about World War II 
regarding specific battles, people, inventions, and operations. Most scholarship about the war in 
Europe focuses on the broader conflict in the ETO (European Theater of Operations). Writing on 
smaller engagements, how they related to, and how they influenced the larger conflict is 
necessary, because they had to be achieved to win the war, just like the larger battles. The 
vicious fight at the Colmar Pocket is an ideal candidate for such an investigation, yet it has been 
largely overlooked in literature. For example, in John Keegan’s landmark The Second World 
War, the Colmar Pocket fails to make the index. In Martin Gilbert’s similarly titled The Second 
World War: A Complete History, he gives a day by day account of the conflict. While he does 
mention the Colmar Pocket, Gilbert only briefly addresses the campaign and Audie Murphy’s 
much-lauded role. Charles B. Macdonald, in his book The Mighty Endeavor: American Armed 
Forces in the European Theater in World War II, provides a brief three paragraph summary of 
the Colmar Pocket, but downplays its significance, and gives no acknowledgment to the 
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struggles faced by U.S. troops. In The Supreme Command: United States Army in World War II: 
European Theater of Operations, Forrest Pogue installs only two brief paragraphs in which he 
surveys the final campaign in France in half a paragraph, hardly conveying the full reality of 
what happened. In his book Citizen Soldiers: The U.S. Army from the Normandy Beaches to the 
Bulge to the Surrender of Germany, June 7, 1944-May 7, 1945, Stephen E. Ambrose, possibly 
one of the best-known World War II historians, states his work is about the U.S. soldier in the 
ETO. While he admits his work is not a compressive narrative about the European War, 
Ambrose mentions the Colmar Pocket only three times--mostly about the struggle between 
Generals Dwight Eisenhower, Omar Bradley, and George Patton, to move troops to eliminate it.  
One older historian who gives some attention to the Colmar Pocket, albeit minor, is 
Russell Weigley. In his book Eisenhower Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and Germany, 
Weigley gives a summary of the campaign in the Colmar Pocket, comparing the area to a tumor 
being removed. Despite the brevity in his work, Weigley does give the Colmar Pocket more 
recognition than other notable World War II historians.4 
Only recently has newer wartime literature shed light on the events around Colmar. One 
of these is The Guns at Last Light by Rick Atkinson, first published in 2013. Guns at Last Light 
describes the Allied struggle from D-Day to the surrender of Germany. Atkinson briefly 
discusses the Colmar Pocket by describing the struggle to finish the campaign in December 
1944, as well as briefly discussing the fall of the Colmar Pocket, which is more than other earlier 
works. First to the Rhine: The 6th Army Group in World War II by Harry Yeide and Mark Stout 
                                                             
4 Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and Germany, 1944-1945 (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1981),596-599.   
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and published in 2007, which analyzes the offensive of the 6th Army Group from Southern 
France into Germany, is more gracious, dedicating an entire chapter to the operation.5  
Yet the engagement that made Audie Murphy famous remains at the periphery of our 
understanding of the intense fighting in the winter of 1944-45. There is not a lot of material the 
general public has easy access to, despite the fact Eisenhower and Gen. Omar Bradley viewed 
the Colmar Pocket as the more serious threat in Europe. Donald Taggert, the historian of the 3rd 
Infantry Division, adds to the mystery: “Following the elimination of the Colmar Pocket, 
comparatively few persons on the outside knew Colmar-if they knew it at all-as anything more 
than the name of an upper Alsatian city whose liberation came after a lengthy period of 
waiting.”6  
Why the lack of study in the public? Historians often look for works written about 
significantly by those famous individuals who were there, and thus they use their guides as a 
reference. Take for instance General Dwight Eisenhower’s work Crusade in Europe. Out of 500 
pages, Eisenhower sums up the fall of the Colmar Pocket in one paragraph. Just one.7 It is 
understandable why historians pay no attention to the situation if Eisenhower himself did not 
spend substantial time to discuss the action, even though he thought it relevant. 
But the Colmar Pocket was and is an important moment in our understanding of 
American involvement in the Second World War. This thesis is about an overlooked story in the 
Allied struggle against Germany which provides an important window into wartime strategy and 
                                                             
5 Rick Atkinson, The Guns at Last Light: The War in Western Europe, 1944-1945(New York: Henry Holt and 
Company,2013), 474-477,531-533; Harry Yeide and Mark Stout, First to the Rhine: The 6th Army Group in World 
War II (St. Paul: Zenith Press, 2007), 308-339. 
6 Colley, Decision at Strasbourg, 191; Donald Taggert, ed., History of the Third Infantry Division in World War II 
(Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1947), 283. 
7 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1949), 374. 
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diplomacy. This thesis also addresses the struggle the average soldier went through is and how 
they dealt with their own personal struggles. This is the story of the American GI in the Colmar 
Pocket, both those in command and those on the battlefield. This is not a work about tactics and 
military maneuvers. This is a study of the soldiers. Each man who held a rifle or threw a grenade 
at the enemy has a story to tell. These include interviews, memoirs, questionnaires, historical 
reports, as well as published material. The story is important to them. Even though all stories and 
memories from World War II and the Colmar Pocket cannot be told, unfortunately, these are 
some which have been found. Not all the experiences are positive. Some instances show men at 
the breaking point, forced to do things that they would rather not do, or ever thought they would 
do. Throughout the offensive, all men had to dig deep and overcome adversity. Other 
experiences are humorous, something seldom seen on the battlefield. All these experiences 
affected them, both positively and negatively, for the rest of their lives. Whatever the 
circumstances, they are memories worth telling. This thesis is an intervention to an untold story. 
Chapter 1 explores how American forces faced peril as they fought against a determined 
enemy with the terrain and weather on their side. They not only had to overcome Germans but 
also tactical errors which posed a serious threat to the outcome of the campaign. Chapter 2 
continues the story and examines how units new to combat experienced this test for the first 
time. They had to overcome their shortcomings by taking a strategic defensive position that more 
hardened men thought they were incapable of doing. Other units, such as the 28th Infantry 
Division, took the task to capture the city of Colmar after being told they were strictly for the 
reserve because of the tremendous losses they suffered in the Battle of the Bulge. Finally, 
Chapter 3 describes the final push to collapse the Colmar Pocket as men reached the breaking 
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point, causing many to retreat to a more barbarous form of warfare. Taken together, these 
chapters elevate individual soldier’s narratives into a scholarly framework that has too often been 
otherwise dominated by high military strategy and diplomacy, and the books created do not 
convey the experiences of the regular soldier. Those soldiers who fought and died in the 
heretofore overshadowed Colmar Campaign have important stories worth narrating and situation 
into the grand scheme of the war in Europe. What follows also shows the fight at the Colmar 
Pocket provides a useful reflection in a microcosm of the nature of warfare in its last months. 
Brutal fighting in bitterly cold conditions rendered what many Americans saw as imminent 
victory into something less than glorious. Perhaps in no war is the tension and fear among its 
combatants so great as in its last months, and this bears out with American soldiers at Colmar. 
No matter the challenges they faced in the Colmar Pocket, they triumphed, and they took their 
lessons they had learned as they plunged deep into the heart of Germany in the Spring of 1945. 
This is their story.
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                                                        Chapter 1 
   The Struggle in Alsace: The Formation of the Colmar Pocket  
and “Operation Grand Slam”: January 22-January 27, 1945 
 
As long as the German bridgehead across the Rhine River in the Colmar area 
remained a constant threat, no major offensive could be launched by the American 
Seventh Army to breach the Siegfried Line. 
 
                                                                                                        Alexander “Sandy” Patch 
                                                                                   Commander, U.S. Seventh Army1 
    
To grasp the situation that ultimately developed inside the Colmar Pocket in early 1945, 
it is important to contextualize the event within the broader course of the war in France in the 
summer of 1944. Many people know well the daring Normandy landings on June 6, 1944, better 
known as “D-Day” or “Operation Overlord”. Overshadowed by D-Day, many are unfamiliar 
with a second amphibious assault which took place in France along the coast of the 
Mediterranean near Marseille on August 15, 1944. Code-named “Operation Dragoon”, this 
assault eventually landed 94,000 troops of the 7th U.S. Army, which later became part of the 6th 
U.S. Army Group, under the command of Lieutenant General Jacob “Jake” Devers (Fig. 2).2  
                                                             
1 Letter from Gen. Alexander “Sandy” Patch to Gen. Norman Cota, October 12, 1945. Quoted in Historical and  
Pictorial Review of the 28th Infantry Division in World War II (Nashville: Battery Press, 1946,1980), 36. 
2 David P. Colley, Decision at Strasbourg: Ike's Strategic Mistake to Halt the Sixth Army Group at the Rhine in  
1944(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008), 31-32; “Jake Devers,” explorepahistory.com, accessed August 28, 
2017, http://explorepahistory.com/hmarker.php?markerId=1-A-2E0. 
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Figure 2. Lt General Jacob “Jake” Devers, Commander of the U.S. 6th Army Group. 
       
While Omar Bradley, Commander of the 1st U.S. Army, and George Patton, Commander 
of the U.S. 3rd Army, fought their way eastward across the European mainland, the 7th Army 
steadily moved north, and eventually joined with other U.S. and French forces into the 6th U.S. 
Army Group. They turned east and moved across France toward the Rhine River. If the Rhine 
River was the finish line, the 6th Army Group won the race. French troops who made up portions 
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of the 6th Army Group reached the city of Strasbourg, located along the Rhine River in Northern 
Alsace, on November 19, 1944. To add further insult to the German’s retreat, the 6th Army 
Group pushed them in rainy conditions and mountainous terrain with many water obstacles. 
During the advance, the Allies destroyed virtually all the German 19th Army. The Germans 
burned everything around them to deprive the Allies of material. Because of this, French 
refugees choked the roads. To hold the last piece of French territory, the remnants of the German 
19th Army proceeded to defend an 850-square mile perimeter which backed up to the Rhine 
River(Fig. 3). In the center was the medieval city of Colmar. This is where the Germans in 
France chose to make their last stand. The Allied objective to advance to the Rhine River, and to 
exploit a crossing had been clear ever since the Allies landed in Normandy on D-Day, and the 
remnants of 19th Army was given the unenviable task of keeping the Allies in    Southern France 
on the west side of the Rhine.3   
                                                             
3Jeffrey J. Clark and Robert Ross Smith, Riviera to the Rhine (Washington D.C.: Center of Military  
History, 1993), 434; J. Glenn Gray, The Warriors: Reflections of Men in Battle (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press,1958,1998), 5; Colley, Decision at Strasbourg, 190, 17; Roger Cirillo, “The Colmar Pocket,” Ardennes, U.S. 
Army Center of Military History, accessed August 28,2017, http://www.army.mil/cmh-
pg/brochures/ardennes/aral.htm.  
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Figure 3. The Colmar Pocket at the beginning of “Operation Cheerful.” 
 
Devers had other plans, however. What he and his 6th Army Group had accomplished  
was the goal of every Allied commander since June 6: get to the Rhine River and cross into 
Germany. Even many Germans agreed a Rhine crossing meant all hope was lost for the Third 
Reich. Devers immediately went to work and readied his men for a cross-river attack.  Devers’s 
goal, once they crossed, was to swing around and sandwich the German forces that opposed 
Patton’s 3rd Army to the north. In October, Devers wrote in his diary once they crossed the 
Rhine, the Allied march “on to Berlin should be easy.” Devers was also quite certain if his plan 
worked, the French 1st Army could defeat the Germans who defended the Colmar Pocket if they 
were even still in France and had not already fled back into Germany.4 
                                                             
4 Colley, Decision at Strasbourg, 95; Jacob Devers, Diary of Jacob Devers (U.S. Army Heritage and Education  
Center), October 5, 1944. Also quoted in Colley, Decision at Strasbourg, 100; Clarke and Smith, Riviera to the  
Rhine, 442.   
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For all the preparation, Devers’s plan ran into a roadblock, namely, Dwight D. 
Eisenhower. Eisenhower, in his book Crusade in Europe, wrote, “I visited Devers to make a 
survey of the situation with him. On his extreme left there appeared to be no immediate 
advantage in pushing down into the Rhine plain.” From the viewpoint of Eisenhower, he dealt 
with the situation with minimal debate; It was his way. This is only half of the story, however. 
On November 24, 1944, Eisenhower traveled through the area to meet with his subordinate 
commanders. At the headquarters of the XV Corps, within the command structure of the 7th 
Army, Eisenhower first heard Devers’s plan to cross the Rhine. Once he heard the news, 
Eisenhower traveled to Devers’s headquarters and immediately put a stop to it. He wanted the 7th 
Army (which was part of the 6th Army Group) to turn north and reinforce Patton and his 3rd 
Army, who was held up in Northern France. If the reinforcements worked, Patton’s 3rd Army 
could move to the Rhine. Devers wrote in his diary “Both (General Alexander M.) Patch and I 
were set to cross the Rhine and we had a clean breakthrough. By driving hard, I feel that we 
could have accomplished our mission.” From Devers’s perspective, one could view 
Eisenhower’s desire as a major problem. Devers tried to explain his position, but Eisenhower 
would not budge. “Why they do this, I do not know,” Devers wrote. Devers would go and 
continue to say, “The decision not to cross the Rhine was a blow to both Patch and myself for we 
were really poised and keyed up to the effort, and I believe it would have been successful. The 
Germans are certainly disorganized and the German 19th Army is practically destroyed.” From 
Devers’s perspective, the Allies’ primary goal since before June 6, for all intents and purposes, 
was now wasted. It was not until March 1945, four months later, the Allies would be able to 
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again cross the Rhine River when parts of Omar Bradley’s 12th Army Group made the celebrated 
capture of the Ludendorff rail bridge at Remagen.5  
      Even though he had not planned this to happen and conducted the war the best way he 
knew how, with this one order Eisenhower made the Battle of the Colmar Pocket a certainty. 
Devers was sure the Colmar Pocket would not have existed if Eisenhower had let him attempt to 
cross the Rhine. Jeffrey Clarke and Robert Ross Smith in their work Riviera to the Rhine add to 
the argument by saying that if the 7th Army been allowed to cross the River, the German forces in 
the Colmar Pocket would be needed elsewhere, and Hitler could have been more willing to a 
retreat across the Rhine River.6 Eisenhower, however, did not have the luxury of hindsight, and 
in his opinion, he did what he thought was best for the Allied advance in Europe. 
      Now that the Germans established the defensive line in the Colmar Pocket, it would need 
elimination. The task to eliminate the German resistance fell to the French 1st Army. “[I] Feel 
sure the French are going to bag the five German divisions which were on their front,” Devers 
wrote. Among the French in the Colmar Pocket, there was also an American infantry division 
attached to the French. This was the 36th Infantry Division, originally the Texas National Guard. 
As the 36th Division pushed east from the Vosges Mountain into the plains around Colmar and 
the Rhine River in December 1944, the experiences they brought back with them were vivid. “It 
was a strange, naked feeling to look out across the open plain after months of nothing but high 
                                                             
5 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City: Doubleday & Sons, 1949), 331; Colley, Decision at 
Strasbourg, 134-135; Devers, Diary of Jacob Devers, November 24 and 26, 1944; Colley, Decision at Strasbourg, 
5. 
6 Colley, Decision at Strasbourg, 190; Clarke and Ross, Riviera to the Rhine, 445; Devers, Diary of Jacob Devers, 
November 27, 1944. 
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forested mountain ahead of us,” Lt. Col. James Critchfield remembered. “We had no idea of the 
bitter fighting that was in store for everyone.”7 
      For the better part of December 1944, the 36th Infantry Division, along with the French, 
slowly moved east, taking one town after another, but they also sustained large losses due to 
vicious German counterattacks. On December 14, Devers met with Maj. General John Dahlquist, 
commander of the 36th. Dahlquist explained to Devers his division had been on the line for 120 
consecutive days and had not the chance to rest and reorganize off of the line. Devers agreed and 
moved the 36th off the line. In their place, Devers moved up the well-rested and well supplied 3rd 
Infantry Division, known to the Germans they faced in Europe as “The Blue and White Devils” 
because of their shoulder insignia and their tenacious fighting reputation that followed them 
across North Africa, Italy, and France.8 The attacks on the Colmar Pocket in December were 
short-lived, however. On December 19, in a meeting with Eisenhower, he disappointed Devers a 
second time. As the Battle of the Bulge raged 200 miles north of their position, Devers still 
believed and assault across the Rhine could work. With Germans preoccupied in the Ardennes, 
he wrote in his diary: 
Events at this moment prove that that maneuver, thoroughly planned and taken 
boldly, would have been successful. I am also confident that the 3rd Division, 
debouching from the Vosges Mountains, with direct orders to cross the Rhine, 
would have forced the bridges at Strasbourg before they could have been blown 
there. This would have automatically relieved the Colmar pocket and given the 
French an opportunity to close on the river.9 
      
                                                             
7 Quoted in Vincent M. Lockhart, T-Patch to Victory: The 36th Division from the Landings in Southern France to the 
End of World War II (Canyon: Staked Plains Press, 1981), 187. 
8 John A. Watters, Letter to the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, January 2, 1993. 
9 Devers, Diary of Jacob Devers, December 14, 1944. 
  
15 
 
      Devers further believed if he pressed the issue, his line would free up the German 
defenses, as well as being able to gain the Colmar Bridgehead, and stop the German divisions 
being transferred from the Eastern Front into the pocket. Again, Eisenhower had none of it and 
ordered portions of Devers’s army north to aid those in the bulge, as well as sending the rest of 
Devers’s forces back to the Vosges Mountains in defense. This gave up valuable ground 
gained.10 
With the retreat to the Vosges, the 6th Army Group’s advance halted when it possibly 
could have exploited the German defenses. The halt in the Allied advance caused additional 
problems for Allied forces, and allowed Hitler to launch his last offensive in the west, called 
“Operation Nordwind.” Portions of the German forces which made up this attack came from, not 
surprisingly, the 19th Army out of the Colmar Pocket, who attempted to link up with other 
German forces moving south from Northern Alsace. Nowhere near the level of the Ardennes 
Offensive, however, the Germans failed to reach their objective, the city of Strasbourg.  Allied 
forces pushed them back into the Colmar Pocket. As January 1945 continued, after one attempt 
to collapse the Colmar Pocket failed and ultimately called off, as U.S. forces retreated to the 
Vosges Mountains, and then had to fight their way back, the subject of the pocket still lingered. 
Eisenhower later analyzed the collapse of the Colmar Pocket in one paragraph. The highlight of 
his analysis was simple: “In January, with the Germans recoiling from their disastrous adventure 
in the Ardennes, I turned my attention to Colmar. The existence of this German position in a 
sensitive part of our lines had always irritated me and I determined that it was to be crushed 
without delay.”  After briefly mentioning the efforts of the Allies to eliminate the pocket, he 
                                                             
10 Devers, Diary of Jacob Devers, December 19, 1944. 
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sums the effort up with as much enthusiasm as a person would say if they had not actually been 
in the fight by stating, “Colmar surrendered February 3 and by the ninth of the month such 
Germans as survived in that region had been driven across the Rhine.”11 
      There was more to the story, however. All the fighting that took place in one of the worst 
winters in European history in tandem with the removal of the last Germans in France cannot 
merely be summed up so simply in one small paragraph by the Supreme Commander of the 
Allied Expeditionary Force. This was not a simple operation to defeat a whipped and 
demoralized enemy. During the first phase to eliminate German forces from the Colmar Pocket, 
U.S. forces found a determined enemy who had the weather as well as the terrain on their side, as 
they tried to repulse the joint U.S.-French offensive. The U.S. soldiers who took part in the 
offensive found unique and horrendous situations, which they had to face and persevere in their 
own way. Some of the GIs experienced combat for the first time. Hardened veterans of numerous 
campaigns had yet another challenge before them. Despite their combat experience, these 
veterans still had to face circumstances which challenged them, both physically and mentally. 
      From the beginning, the task to eliminate the Colmar Pocket fell to the commander of the 
French 1st Army, Marshal Jean Lattre de Tassigny. Traveling to Vitel on January 11, 1945, de 
Tassigny met with Devers. At the meeting, the two men drew up plans to use both French and 
U.S. forces.  “As usual,” Devers wrote in his diary, “we are short of tank destroyers throughout 
the Sixth Army Group, as well as tank battalion. We have not even received replacements for the 
ones we have.” To de Tassigny’s delight, Devers asked from Eisenhower and received additional 
divisions. Among these units included the 28th Infantry Division, who had fought in the 
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Ardennes. Eisenhower made it clear the 28th should only be used on the defensive, if at all, due to 
their state of exhaustion from the Ardennes fighting. Additionally, Eisenhower said he might be 
able to spare the U.S. 12th Armored Division if they became available.12 
      As preparations for the offensive began, planners noticed all the challenges the Colmar 
Pocket held. Command estimated there were at least eight infantry divisions facing the Allies. In 
basic terms, the Germans outnumbered the Allies. Marshall De Tassigny also noted the difficulty 
the Allies faced with respect to the winter:  
As for the weather it is impossible to imagine it more frightful. Though smiling 
on fine days, the Alsatian plain resembled an immense city of the dead, covered 
with a thick shroud of snow, from which emerged the skeletons of trees, haunted 
by croaking clouds of crows. It was 20 Centigrade below zero, the wind howled 
and there were over three feet of snow. Anyone with a roof over his head-and that 
was not the attacker-had a master card in the struggle.13   
      
      To add to the weather, the Allies faced terrain suited perfectly for the German defenders. 
For those GIs in the 3rd Infantry Division, the route they had to take, which ran from the town of 
Guemar to their final objective, the fortress city of Neuf-Brisach, the ground they fought over 
was as flat as the plains many of them grew up on back in the United States, with many water 
obstacles in the way. There was one advantage, however. The Allies had in their favor as many 
as four and possibly five armored divisions (depending on if the U.S. 12th Armored  
Division moved to the area) up against possibly only one Panzer division.  Intelligence estimated 
the opposing German forces were equal to twenty-five 500 (12,500) man battalions, each varying 
in fighting strength and morale. These included inexperienced, as well as veteran combatants. 
Other historians such as Russell Weigley believed the Allies were up against as many as 50,000 
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men.  Devers noted, “I believe we will have a tough 4-5 days but that we will be able to outlast 
the Germans and thus get out of our difficulties.”14 
      The route the Americans took through the Colmar Pocket was not lost on the German 
defenders. Before the attack, Helmut Thumm, a general serving in the German 19th Army, saw 
three distinct possibilities for an American attack into the pocket. Out of the three possibilities, 
only one gave him real concern: an attack along the Ill River. Thumm ascertained if an attack 
through this area were successful, the Allies would have a clear shot to the Rhine, not to mention 
the city of Colmar could be seized after being surrounded. Additionally, the supply route for the 
Germans through Neuf-Brisach would be threatened. Thumm knew his front lines could do an 
adequate job of defending the perimeter, but he lacked reserves to hold up for an extended 
period. Thumm therefore requested to shrink the defensive line to adequately defend the 
perimeter. Not only was this idea rejected, Berlin actually ordered Thumm to expand the size of 
the perimeter. Inside the defensive position, the Germans had at their disposal only about 30 to 
40 percent of their anti-tank weapons, as well as only about 65 tanks. Despite these 
shortcomings, the Germans did have a few advantages. In addition to the terrain and weather, the 
Germans had plenty of small-arms ammunition, as well as a shorter line of communication to 
coordinate attacks.15 
*  *  * 
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      In the northern area of the pocket, preparations were ready for the offensive to begin. 
Time to departure was three hours after sunset on the evening of January 22, two days after the 
French began their attack in the southern part of the Colmar Pocket. The 3rd Infantry Division’s 
task was a relatively simple one from the outside: capture crossings along the Fecht and Ill 
Rivers around the towns of Guemar and Ostheim, then swing south and capture crossings along 
the Colmar Canal, and isolate the city of Colmar. Once they accomplished this objective, there 
were two possibilities the division could take next: capture Colmar and block the Fecht Valley 
west of Turcheim, or to assist the 5th French Armored Division at the fortress city of Neuf-
Brisach. This plan of attack went along the thought process developed by General Thumm, as 
well as other German commanders inside the Colmar Pocket. Even though this route taken by the 
Allies worried the Germans the most, they also knew this was not going be easy for the 
Americans because of the terrain they had to cross.16  
      Instructions were more complex in the lower ranks as each unit had an individual mission 
to carry out. Personnel painted all the vehicles in the 3rd Infantry Division white, in addition to 
the men being dressed in mattress sheets and pillowcases to conceal themselves in the snow (Fig. 
4). “Operation Grand Slam,” what the 3rd Division referred the plan of attack as, commenced. As 
the evening of January 22 arrived, the entire division, about 15,000 men strong, was on the 
move. The usual fighting compliment of foot soldiers usually consisted of the 7th, 15th, and 30th 
Infantry Regiments. During the Colmar Campaign, however, the 3rd Division received additional 
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reinforcements.  The 254th Infantry Regiment, normally of the 63rd Infantry Division, was 
temporarily attached to the 3rd.17 
 
Figure 4. 15th Infantry soldiers on the move in the Colmar Pocket. This shows an excellent 
example of the white “spook suits” worn by the soldiers. 
       
The men who made up the 3rd Infantry Division were mostly replacement troops. 
Company E, for example, had in its ranks exactly two men who had been with the company on 
D-Day. The 7th Infantry Regiment had held the line along the Colmar Pocket since December 30 
to prepare for the attack. They knew what was to come. Days earlier, the men came off the line 
to rest. What told them an attack was imminent was the presence of Red Cross girls there 
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handing out doughnuts and coffee. “They were regarded as the harbinger of bad news, because 
we saw them only when we were going into combat,” one veteran remembered. Kitchen 
companies were also brought up, which allowed for three hot meals a day before the attack but 
also caused most the men to come down with diarrhea.18 
As preparations continued, the 7th Infantry Regiment learned their initial plan of attack 
was to cross the Fecht River, south of Ostheim. These plans proved fruitless, however. Patrols 
found crossing the river where it was first proposed a disadvantage.  The banks were too steep 
for a feasible crossing. Therefore, planners chose to cross the river below the town of Guemar, 
which was in Allied hands. The start time for their part of “Operation Grand Slam” was 
scheduled for 2100(9 p.m.) hours on January 22. The march up to the assembly positions was a 
treacherous one. German observers witnessed the movement of American troops across the river 
and unleashed artillery in the GIs. The men were not deterred, however, and continued to move 
into position, past red patches in the snow stained with blood where their comrades had fallen. 
By 2100 hours, the men of the 3rd Infantry Division were in place to attack.19 
      The tense situation of combat became clear as soon as the men crossed the river. About 
100 yards south of the crossing, men of the 1st Battalion encountered a minefield undetectable 
because of the snow. This resulted in several casualties. Even though many were not sure where 
the source of the explosions came from, many dropped to the ground. This proved the wrong 
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thing to do, since soldiers dropping to the ground made a bigger footprint on the frozen ground, 
and therefore ran the chance of setting off more mines, risking serious wounds or death. Others 
froze in their tracks to prevent themselves from setting off the mines around them. These men 
were typically the hardened veterans of numerous campaigns and therefore knew what to do in 
this situation. They waited for the scouts to make their way through the mines. As the scouts 
slowly moved forward, the others followed, making sure they walked in the tracks of the men 
before them. As they traversed the minefield, other men avoided the mines and proceeded to 
move around the field and engaged the enemy. This caused the German defenders to leave in 
confusion, abandoning much of their weapons and equipment.20 
      As 1st Battalion of the 7th Infantry Regiment moved through the woods, they met 
sporadic German resistance. Company A received casualties, which forced them to bring the 
wounded to an abandoned German bunker. Inside the bunker, hot food on the stove greeted the 
GIs, as well as Schnapps, evidence the Germans made a hasty retreat. As the aid men set up their 
triage area, 1st Battalion carried on with the attack. A few minutes later the aid men heard a bullet 
enter the bunker. Assuming the bullet was from the Americans, one of the aid men shouted, 
“Stop the shooting-we’re GI’s!” Upon that reaction, someone threw a hand grenade through the 
door. Miraculously no injuries occurred when it exploded. As they looked out the window, the 
aid men saw several German soldiers. As they realized the situation they were in, the aid men 
shouted, “Kamerad,” stating their intention to surrender, and quickly abandoned any German 
souvenirs they had acquired. The Germans brought inside two wounded and asked the aid men to 
care for them. The aid men assumed the Germans knew they were behind American lines, hence 
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their positive behavior.  After about 30 minutes, some of the aid men persuaded the Germans to 
allow them to go to the American lines and bring back stretchers for the wounded. As the medics 
made their way to the American lines, they explained their predicament to their superiors. To 
keep from losing more men, their superiors ordered them not go back to the bunker. Despite this, 
Americans eventually found the bunker, and after some debate, the Germans took off and the 
wounded, both American and enemy, went to the hospital together.21 
      Around 0400, Company A was given orders to enter the town of Ostheim (also known as 
Brunwald). Once inside, they contacted men of Company C. Shortly afterward, Company A 
encountered a German machine gun emplacement. As the fire kept them pinned down, two 
German tanks approached undeterred by rifle fire from the U.S. soldiers. As they waited for U.S. 
armor, two bazooka men approached the tanks close enough to take out one of them and caused 
the other to withdraw. Upon the arrival of U.S. armor, they.22    
Other units of the 7th Infantry Regiment also had extreme difficulty. 2nd Battalion moved 
into the fray. As they moved through Colmar Woods around Ostheim, the men of Company E 
found their progress impeded due to the thick undergrowth. This caused the platoons to lose 
contact with each other. At 0700, 2nd Battalion contacted the Germans, which led to a tense 
situation. As they moved forward, the column heard the command to halt, which began low but 
as it traveled throughout the column it ended too loud and gave away their position. Upon 
hearing the noise, a German machine gun opened on them. The German troops waited until the 
last possible moment to open fire to ensure the maximum number of casualties. The German 
bullets tore into the GIs, who sank into the snow, and somehow hoped they would be protected 
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as the German fire showed no signs of stopping. The 3rd Platoon commander ran among his men, 
begging them to move forward. This drew the attention of the German machine gunners in the 
vicinity, who turned their full attention upon 3rd Platoon. The German sprayed the area with 
machine gun fire at knee-height. The platoon commander, in an act of desperation, moved out in 
front of his men. After about ten yards, the ground gave way and he fell into a ditch. Seeing the 
protection the ditch could give his men, the platoon commander yelled for his men to move 
forward into the position. One man, Pfc. Stephen Ludlum, moved forward and fired on the 
German machine gun position. Ludlum fired all his rifle grenades and then continued to fire his 
rifle at the German position. Being the lone man firing attracted the attention of the Germans, 
however, who quickly shot Ludlum through the forehead. Trapped in the ditch, 3rd Platoon was 
down to around five men. As their clothes became saturated with icy water, they moved from 
one spot to another, until they were utterly exhausted. Their feet and toes were numb, as well as 
their fingers. In a futile attempt to warm them, the men would take off their gloves and rub their 
fingers to restore circulation. Their movement was very slow. After two hours, they had only 
managed to move about 100 yards. Lying on their sides and backs to help relieve their frozen 
muscles, they still had to keep low because bullets whizzed just inches above them.23  
During this entire engagement, 2nd Battalion commander Maj. Jack Duncan watched in 
absolute shock as the scene unfolded. Calling in artillery, relief overcame Duncan when he saw 
the shells land among the Germans. Duncan then implored his men to move forward. Some were 
too shocked to move, but other managed to get to their feet and charged the enemy. This 
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moment, however, took the GIs directly into the friendly fire of the U.S. artillery, wounding 
several men. Those German still in the position had either been killed or surrendered.24 
      Over the next two days, the men of the 7th Infantry Regiment succeed to clear out the 
areas around Ostheim. In the early hours of January 24, the 1st Battalion began their attack on the 
Chateau de Schoppinwihr, a large mansion and farm complex outside of the town. Once they 
succeeded to eliminate the chateau as a defensive position, the main road into Colmar would be 
threatened. Not only that, but there were rumors the chateau held various items which could be 
taken as souvenirs for the GIs to take back home. The attack began with Company A moving 
down the main highway, which led to the chateau. As they moved, they came upon a group of 
soldiers wearing white clothing, which was the same as the personnel in Company A were 
wearing. There was something, about their demeanor, however, which was not quite right. 
Sending one man forward to verify, he called out to the men and asked if they were GIs. In 
response, the unknown men jumped into prepared positions and fired on the Americans, 
revealing they were German. In a bad situation, the commander of Company A sent for 
reinforcements. Reinforcements arrived in the form American armor. The tanks fired upon the 
Germans, killing some and causing the rest to scatter. These men were easily eliminated once 
they were out of their defenses. German forces in the chateau then opened fire, forcing Company 
A to abandon their attack. Responsibility for the attack upon the chateau fell to Companies B and 
C. The attack required them to move across the open field leading up to the chateau. As they 
advanced without cover, the men almost made it to the chateau when they were suddenly fired 
upon by German defenses. Urging his men forward, Company B commander Richard Kerr got 
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his men to the highway which ran beside the chateau, where they took cover along its elevation. 
As they took cover, the officers in Company B moved about and tried to get their men to spread 
out to limit the number of casualties.25  
Company C also met very stiff resistance. Pvt. W. Bert Craft had recently volunteered to 
lug the heavy B.A.R. (Browning Automatic Rifle) into the fight, which weighed twenty pounds. 
The heaviness of the weapon made him instantly regret the decision. But the heavy firepower 
proved a lifesaver when his squad ran into a group of Germans. According to Pvt. Craft, the 
situation became tense:  
We were in a bad way. We were disorganized, we didn’t know where we were, and 
Colen (a buddy) had been hit and was lying down across the calves of my legs. I 
was lying on the ground. This German turned around and filled Colen full of bullets. 
Not a one struck me. There were men crying. There was this boy from Florida, 
crying and carrying on, ‘Oh, Lord, we are going to be killed,’ and I dressed him 
down. I told him we had to fight and for him to quit being a baby.26 
 
Craft’s B.A.R. jammed during the fight. In desperation, he crawled to his company 
commander, Capt. Beverly Hayes. Craft remembered, “I tried to talk to [him], and I couldn’t get 
a response, just a grunt.” Hayes was dying and soon perished in the snow.  The Germans then 
turned the heavy machine gun fire into the GIs, and wounded several men, but not Craft. As they 
approached the ditch where the GIs were, the Germans began to lob hand grenades in the GIs 
position. Craft continued:  
They would come back and say, ‘Come surrender.’ There was one GI who jumped 
up to surrender, with his hands up, and they shot him down. I vowed then, that I 
wouldn’t surrender. They kept coming up, throwing grenades, and they threw one 
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that exploded on my helmet. My ears were ringing. I couldn’t hear anything. The 
concussion shook me up. There were only six of us left.27 
 
Along with another man, Craft decided to run for it. As he pulled the pin on his last 
grenade, Craft looked over the ditch and spotted three Germans standing together. Craft threw 
the grenade, which landed right in the middle of them. Craft took off while the other man 
covered his escape. As he ran the Germans opened fire. Feinting being shot, Craft fell to the 
ground and played dead. As he got loose of his equipment, Craft tried to make another break for 
it. “I could feel the bullets whizzing by me. I had only one weapon that night, the Lord,” Craft 
later wrote. He played dead a few more times but finally made it back to the American lines. As 
he approached the lines, a fellow GI challenged him and demanded the password. Craft 
responded incredulously, “I don’t know the damn password. I’ll tell you what Buddy. I’m from 
the state of Mississippi and Mount Olive is my hometown.” The man let Craft in, and at the aid 
station, the medics diagnosed him with a concussion. He stayed on the line, however, and helped 
the remnants of his company move mortars until he could replace his rifle. 28 
                                                         *  *  * 
All alone, Lt. Kerr of Company B realized something needed to happen if his men were 
to survive. He rose to the top of the highway and yelled, “Lets’ go!” Inspired by his actions, the 
men followed “yelling at the top of their lungs.”29 Terrified, some of the Germans threw down 
their weapons. The GIs threw grenades and poured point-blank rifle fire on the rest. The 
momentum of Company B could not be stopped; An hour later they had eliminated the chateau’s 
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outer defenses. By the evening of January 24, the chateau, as well as the surrounding woods, was 
in American hands.30  
After an afternoon of counterattacks, the men of the 7th Infantry Regiment moved 
towards their next objective the following day: the village of Houssen. The attack required the 
efforts of all three battalions and took off around 0600 on the morning of January 25. It was the 
job of the 2nd Battalion to attack from the north. To soften up the defenses, American artillery 
staged timed barrages against the German defenses in the open areas outside of Houssen. As they 
moved closer to the town, the battalion came under fire from German machine guns. To bypass 
the Germans, the battalion swung around the defensive position. After an hour of crawling and 
dodging fire, they reached the outskirts of Houssen from the west.31 
      While 2nd Battalion moved on Houssen, 3rd Battalion faced similar adversity, as well as 
an unusual encounter with the Germans. While the assault moved forward with relative ease, 
despite the morning fog, the forward elements of the assault became separated because of the 
smoke screen the artillery had laid down. In the confusion, unbeknownst to the GIs, German 
soldiers infiltrated the Americans. As he marched along with other GIs, Tech Sgt. Robert 
Higgins noticed something unusual about these new arrivals, and called out to a fellow soldier, 
“isn’t that a Kraut in front of you?” The soldier immediately noticed the problem but hesitated to 
fire his weapon, because he had a rifle grenade attached to the barrel. One German did not 
hesitate. Turning around, he promptly killed the GI before he disappeared in the fog.32  
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      Once Houssen was in American hands, the 7th Infantry Regiment continued to mop up 
sporadic resistance. In the field northeast of the town, American armor harassed the German 
defenders. During the battle, a lone German managed to make it out of the field and surrender. 
He indicated to the GIs there were several more Germans who wanted to surrender but were 
apprehensive about it unless the Americans came out for them. Pfc. Graham Stewart took the 
prisoner out as the other men covered his advance. The prisoner motioned to his comrades to 
surrender. Twelve Germans emerged and gladly surrendered. After major operations in Houssen 
ceased, German stragglers appeared off and on throughout the day to surrender. The Americans 
set up an OP(outpost) inside the church steeple in town. From this vantage point, the Americans 
observed the German retreat into the city of Colmar.33 
      Throughout the next four days, the 7th Infantry Regiment continued their advance to take 
the Station de Bennwihr and the village of Rosenkranz. The 1st Battalion moved out towards the 
Station de Bennwihr from the Chateau de Schoppinwihr, which they held while the other two 
battalions of the 7th assaulted Houssen. As the GIs moved forward towards Rosenkranz, they 
encountered German soldiers who refused to surrender. Hand grenades tossed into the bunkers 
persuaded them otherwise.  The Germans emerged from their hideout shouting, “Fuck Hitler!” as 
they made slashing motion across their throats.34 
The Germans then counterattacked. A solitary tank came into view of a six-man outpost 
of GIs. Pfc. Jose Valdez (Fig. 5) opened fire with his B.A.R. and caused the tank to retreat. He 
then saw three Germans sneaking up on their position, and killed all three attackers. The 
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Germans then assaulted the OP with two full-strength companies of infantry. The small group of 
GIs managed to hold out against the overwhelming force for approximately fifteen minutes until 
the Germans began to encircle the position. As the patrol leader ordered the men to withdraw, 
Valdez volunteered to stay behind. Valdez fired into the Germans as the other men ran one at a 
time towards American lines. Despite this, three of the GIs received wounds. Valdez himself was 
also seriously wounded when a bullet hit him in the stomach and exited out his back. Despite the 
extreme pain, Valdez continued to fire at the Germans until the other men in his patrol made it to 
safety. Valdez then called down artillery and mortar fire on the German, sometimes to within 
fifty feet of his position. Due to the fire, the Germans were unable to advance any farther. 
Valdez’s heroics allowed the rest of Company B to move forward and add further fire on the 
Germans, completing halting their attack. Despite his wounds, Valdez dragged himself back to 
American lines.35 
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          Figure 5. Pfc. Jose Valdez 
 Four men carried Valdez back to the aid station. “He’d been paralyzed from the waist 
down,” Pvt. Stephen Kovatch recalled. “[We] carried him back to the railroad station. He was in 
bad shape then. I knew he wasn’t going to live.” Valdez held on until February 17, when he 
succumbed to his wounds. He was later posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for his 
courage.36 
Over the next four days, the 7th Infantry Regiment continued the attack and captured 
nearly 400 German prisoners while suffering about the same number of casualties. Between 
January 26 and 27, the 7th was relieved by the 109th Infantry Regiment of the newly arrived 28th 
Infantry Division. From here, they prepared for their next phase of the offensive.37  
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*  *  * 
      For all the adversity faced by the soldiers of the 7th Infantry Regiment in the early part of 
the offensive, what they faced was nothing compared to the other units of the 3rd Infantry Division, 
the 30th and 15th Infantry Regiments. At 2100(9 p.m.) hours, on the night of January 22, the 30th, 
under the command of Col. Lionel C. McGarr, crossed the Fecht River at Guemar. To achieve 
surprise, the men moved forward without artillery preparation. By 2200, the 1st and 3rd Battalions 
had successfully crossed the river.38  
Near sunup on January 23, elements of 1st Battalion reached the Maison Rouge, a red farm 
complex with a bridge nearby, which could allow them to cross the Ill River. To their relief, the 
GIs found the bridge, which was medium-sized and made of wood, to still be intact. While the 
bridge could support infantry across the Ill, it needed reinforcement with metal braces placed by 
engineers for armor to cross the river. The men of Company A began to secure the area west of 
the bridge, to prepare for an assault by men of the 3rd Battalion around mid-morning of January 
23. By noon, the bridge was in American hands, and GIs had moved across the Ill River into the 
Riedwhir Woods. Beyond the bridge, however, they were in a dangerous position. The section of 
the woods they were in exposed the men to German armor and infantry. They were so close one 
man remembered, “The Germans made a lot of racket; they talked loud as hell. We stayed there 
for several hours and fortunately were not spotted. The ground was too hard for digging. If they 
had known we were there, they would have really blasted us.”39  
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Not content to stop in open ground, 3rd Battalion moved forward and took the bridge across 
the Colmar Canal, below the village of Holtzwihr, as fast as they could. By 1630 (4:30 p.m.), the 
battalion secured Holtzwihr and set up defensive positions in the town. The 2nd Battalion moved 
across the bridge and into the Riedwihr Woods. The need to capture and move across the Colmar 
Canal was paramount. Aside from the Riedwihr woods, the area around the bridge at Maison 
Rouge up to the second bridge was flat and offered little cover in the way of defense. The absence 
of American armor became a major concern to the exposed men. One GI remembered Companies 
A and B were seeing “too much enemy armor” out towards Riedwihr. Those at Regimental 
Command promised 1st Battalion armor was on the way, and they needed to seize the bridges 
across the Colmar Canal that evening. The commander of Company A responded, “I hope to hell 
our tanks get here before we have to go to Riedwihr.”40 
With men of the 30th Infantry Regiment across the river and unprotected, an extremely bad 
command and engineering mistake occurred. For the armor to cross the bridge, the engineers used 
metal tread ways to strengthen the bridge. When these tread ways were laid, however, the engineers 
realized they were too short. Not having the rest of the tread ways available until dark, as well as 
dealing with pressure from command to get armor across to support the men on the other side as 
fast as possible, those in command made the decision to allow tanks to cross. According to the 
engineers, even though the reinforcing material was shorter than anticipated, they felt confident in 
the job they had done. To test the bridge, the engineers had a 10-ton construction truck cross the 
bridge and then return, thus proving to them the stability of their repair job. The first tank made it 
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34 
 
to the center when the bridge collapsed, dumping the tank into the river (Fig. 6). Because of this 
major miscalculation, the 30th Infantry Regiment now found themselves completely cut off from 
armored support. To make matters worse, the expected German counterattack on the towns of 
Riedwihr and Holtzwihr began about ten minutes later. The counterattack could not have come at 
a more advantageous time for the Germans. One American officer noted it was “As if they’d had 
a liaison officer with us.”41 
 
              Figure 6. The collapsed bridge and tank at the Ill River crossing. 
       
The German attack caught the 30th Infantry Regiment who had entered the towns 
completely by surprise. Most were unable to dig into defensive positions. Even though he was 
not caught up in the fighting just yet, Audie Murphy described the action as only an infantryman 
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can. “The third battalion is hit by ten enemy tanks and tank destroyers,” Murphy recalled. 
“Against the armor our men have no defense. They might as well be tackling crazed elephants 
with their bare hands. Even if they had time to dig in, our men could hardly make a dent in the 
frozen ground. They are completely without cover.”42 
      When the counterattack began, 1st Battalion was on their way to Riedwihr, totally out in 
the open and exposed to German fire.  3rd Battalion was not much better off, as they only just 
began their defensive preparations in Holtzwihr, and were still clearing houses of Germans. As 
the Germans began to work their way back into town, they began to take American prisoners 
who thought it was the Germans who were clearing the houses out, instead of the other way 
around. In one house, they captured the company commanders of both Companies I and K, who 
were discussing the operation together. German tanks soon appeared and drove the survivors 
back into the woods. Once inside the woods, the men knew they were in trouble. One Lt. 
remembered, “[W]e could hear the infantry getting off a tank when it would stop. They were 
laughing and joking and talking loud. They didn’t have a care in the world. They must have 
known they had us by the balls.”  Most of the men of who remained from Companies I and K 
retreated across the open fields around Holtzwihr. Many could not believe they managed to make 
it without getting killed. One officer recalled, “we kept milling around, keeping out of the way of 
the [German] infantry, and praying it gets dark.” Capt. Warren Stuart, commander of Company I, 
15th Infantry Regiment, whose men were in reserves, managed to cross the Ill using a smaller 
footbridge. There he noticed men running everywhere. Trying to stop the flow of the retreating 
men, and to get a sense of the problem, Stuart finally grabbed a man and asked what the situation 
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was. The soldier said, “Beaucoup Mark VIs up there.” When pressed for further information 
about how many “a beaucoup” was, the soldier responded, “About a half-dozen.” Upon asking 
how many actually had been the sighted, the soldier relented and said, “I seen only one…but he 
was coming straight for me!” Once darkness fell, officers on the far side of the bridge noted it 
was extremely difficult to keep the men together. Small groups of men would take off towards 
the Ill River. Most of them made it back safely to the bridge at Maison Rouge, and to the other 
side of the Ill.43 
      Despite being cut off, the men on the west side of the Ill tried desperately to support those 
cut-off on the other side. Artillery support was the strongest it had been since the 3rd Infantry 
Division fought at Anzio in Italy in 1944. Around 2000(8 p.m.) hours the order was given to fall 
back across the river, giving the bridgehead back to the Germans. Casualties for the 30th Infantry 
Regiment were extremely high as a result of the counterattack, losing 350 men, most of them 
captured by the Germans. The average company fell from around 111 men to about 73. 
Companies I and K were virtually wiped out, with over 100 men alone captured when the 
Germans overran Holtzwihr.44 The men who made it back to the river were a miserable sight. Lt. 
Melvin Lasky of the 15th Infantry described it best:  
“Safe” in the forest of the west bank, groups began congregating and searching 
for a way back to “The House”. Now 15 and 20 men together, they appeared like 
“a great disorganized mob.” Combat jackets were drenched, and the cheese-cloth 
of the white camouflage capes were freezing into weird drapery. There(sic) were 
still mumbling about tanks everywhere, as the men, frightened and dazed, began 
to be rounded up by officers and non-coms in the woods and taken back for 
warmth, and reorganization, and reissue of equipment. 45 
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     Even though it seemed hopeless for the men of the 30th Infantry Regiment, out of the chaos 
came examples of bravery and sacrifice. In one example, a platoon sergeant would not allow his 
men to retreat until they had used up all their ammunition. In another instance, a lone radio 
operator managed to drag his radio back to the Ill River. While the most of 30th’s equipment was 
left on the east side of the Ill, numerous men used their brains and stored their weapons in dry 
wells, or buried them in snow banks, allowing them to later be retrieved.46 As midnight 
approached, one Army combat historian described the mess around the Maison Rouge as “a great 
vortex for hundreds of scared, cold, often wounded, and in many cases defenseless men.”  
Another officer described it “like a God-damned scene from Civil War days. Men were lying 
right next to each other along the road. Officers were running around.”47 
 Companies G and C were protecting the bridge, as well as the river crossing at the Ill 
River at Maison Rouge. Even before the first German tanks appeared, men in Company G started 
to retreat. As a result, the men in Companies C and G were now thoroughly mixed. When the 
German tanks and infantry arrived at the bridge around 2130(9:30 p.m.) and took out the 
American antitank defenses, the line collapsed. Lt. Wright, a platoon officer in Company G, sent 
not only his platoon sergeant, but any other sergeants from the company to gather as many men 
as they could.  After a short time, the sergeants returned with 21 men. Wright gave orders to 
follow him, and they moved out. After a short distance, a runner came up to him and reported the 
men were dispersing and falling back towards safety. Wright ran back and observed, “blurred 
shapes moving a good distance down the bank and going fast.” After an all-out sprint, Wright 
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managed to catch the retreating men. He rounded up an additional 11 men. Before they started 
out again for their original objective, Wright remembered, “I told them I was putting a sergeant 
in front of them and was bringing up the rear and that I would shoot anyone who turned back 
because I was pretty pissed off that they’d run off on me that way.” They moved out and then 
dug in the northern section of where Companies C and G had originally defended the crossing on 
the Ill.48 
Everything might have been lost except for one figure on the west side of the Ill River. 
That figure was Col. Lionel McGarr, commander of the 30th Infantry Regiment. According to the 
official history of the 30th Infantry Regiment:  
Colonel McGarr was assembling in the Colmar Forest a group of two hundred men 
lost from their units, giving them talks of encouragement and making arrangements 
for their re-equipment and prompt return to their organizations. He next toured the 
entire front of the Regiment, stopping at each foxhole, encouraging each man, 
redisposing men to improve positions and inspiring all whom he contacted by his 
own courage and disregard enemy tanks and machine-gun fire that literally covered 
the 5,000-meter sector over which he walked during the five-hour period that 
night.49   
 
      McGarr, who graduated from West Point in 1928 and eventually rose to the rank of 
Lieutenant General, simply did what his training required him to do: be a leader. He worked so 
close to the action he was almost killed by a bullet that ricocheted off a tank. Despite the close 
call, he continued to move about, and personally inspected the positions of his battalions. Calls 
for tents, stoves, blankets, and hot coffee went out, since most of 30th Infantry Regiment were 
wet, cold, and traumatized.50 
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As the 30th was reorganized, the men of the 15th Infantry Regiment prepared to move into 
action. On the west side of the river, small arms fire returned to the German side. Equipment left 
by the 30th Infantry Regiment was hastily set up. One officer came upon a ready machine gun 
nest that the 30th abandoned and fired on two Germans caught outside of their tank. He was soon 
assisted by another soldier who fed the belt ammunition into the weapon. As the Germans 
returned fire with their main guns, the first explosions fell short and knocked the GIs and their 
gun of their perch. The men repositioned and returned fire, along with four other men, bringing 
the total number of men defending the crossing to six. A second shell directly hit the machine 
gun emplacement, and again knocked the officer back but this time sent a piece of the machine 
gun barrel through the head of his assistant.51  
      By 2030(8:30 p.m.) on the night of the 23, with the 30th Infantry Regiment regrouped on 
the west side of the Ill, Gen. John “Pappy” O’Daniel, the commander of the 3rd Infantry Division, 
ordered the 15th Infantry Regiment into the disaster to regain the bridge at the Maison Rouge. To 
regain the momentum, the regiment put the 3rd Battalion on alert. They also sent two companies 
of men to retake the bridge.  At around 0500 the two companies, I and K, managed to remove the 
small unit of Germans who held the bridge and rescued several 30th Infantry men who had 
hidden out. After they seized the bridge, the two companies were to hold this position, as well as 
the crossroads nearby.  The men knew they were in a tough spot, and tried to dig through the 
frozen ground. “It’s suicide,” one of Capt. Stuart’s platoon leaders, Lt. Eugene Koschkin, 
shouted to him. “A man hasn’t got a chance out here.” Stuart agreed and radioed a request to 
move back behind the road embankment which provided a better defensive position. Command 
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denied his request but promised armor support for them. As daylight approached, one of the 
company first sergeants went on an inspection of the line. Upon seeing the difficulty his men had 
in the frozen ground, he yelled, “Get those God-damned holes in the ground. We’re going to 
catch hell!”52 
Soon after the sergeant’s inspection, the Germans launched another counterattack to 
retake the bridge around daylight of January 24. Capt. Stuart screamed into the radio for the 
armor, which had not arrived. Friendly artillery on the other side of the river dispersed some of 
the attack but a few German tanks continued to push on toward their positions. Some of the men 
became frightened and fled on their own. Those who remained were ready to go even though 
they chose to follow orders and stayed. “We had practically one foot out of the foxhole,” one 
sergeant recalled.53  
At approximately 0800, Company I of the 15th Infantry Regiment was overrun. 
Numerous men became crushed under the treads of German tanks. Even though they dug their 
foxholes to prevent such a thing from happening, the shallowness of the foxholes in the frozen 
ground turned their trenches into ready-made graves. The Germans shot others as they attempted 
to surrender. One of the men shot was Lt. Koschkin, who said remaining in their position was 
suicide. Others ran for it, “hollering and screaming like they were scared to death.” Those GIs 
taken prisoner were marched to the German rear. As they moved out, other 15th Infantry men in 
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the Maison Rouge command post observed their plight. “There goes Item” (Company I), We 
better start practicing our ‘Heil Hitlers,’ someone remarked.54 
Those who survived managed to retreat into the defenses of Company K, and, along with 
the company, tried to hold the bridge. The defense of Company K was not long, however, and 
they had to retreat back to the Ill. Most commanders had withdrawn to the other side of the Ill to 
reorganize a defense. Out of an original force of 150 to 200 men, only about 60 were left when 
the German attack commenced. With only a small amount of men from Company K staying to 
hold the line, those inside the Maison Rouge found their situation precarious. Many abandoned 
the loot they had seized from German prisoners; noting if discovered it would be bad for the 
potential prisoner. A search of the house had turned up a bottle of whiskey, and the men passed it 
from person to person.55  
      Despite the setbacks, the efforts of the handful of GIs holding the resistance, as well as 
the artillery being called down upon the Germans, was having a noted effect on the speed of the 
German advance. Even though the advance slowed, many believed the holdup was only a 
temporary one. “By God,” one soldier said, “when they come in here I’m going to give up.” The 
officer in charge of the artillery fire responded, “When they come in here, I’ll bring our fire right 
down on the house!” When asked later about his comment the officer remarked, “I had a couple 
of drinks, and nothing to eat for 36 hours, so what the hell I’m a hero.” At around 0930 
American artillery began to arrive in large quantities. Fear of capture quickly dissipated in the 
Maison Rouge. The dazed sense which had overcome the Americans in the past few days soon 
fell to the Germans, who began to wander in a confused fashion, while the 15th Infantry 
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Regiment’s men and artillery fire did not stop (one artillery blast blew a German soldier 20-30 
feet into the air). American armor finally managed to cross the river, thanks to a quickly 
constructed bridge. At 1430(2:30 p.m.), 1st Battalion counterattacked, and finally took the 
bridgehead once and for all. As they advanced back out to their old positions, they came across 
Pvt. Harry Smith, who had never left his foxhole during the entire engagement. With his foxhole 
mate dead from machine-gun fire, Smith had to play dead, which fooled the Germans. Even 
though he was alive and physically unharmed, some men noticed that due to the whole affair he 
was “practically a gibbering idiot.” 56 
      Even though there were major setbacks for the 30th Infantry Regiment, the adversity they 
faced was something they could recover from. Despite the fact GIs left the vast majority of their 
equipment (80%) on the east side of the Ill, whether through haste or negligence, the Germans 
made no efforts to round-up the abandoned items. If not for this oversight, the 30th might have 
needed removal off the line to reorganize and resupply. The 3rd Division G-4(supply) pulled 
through this crisis exceptionally well and made sure the men received dry clothes, hot meals, as 
well as new equipment and vehicles to replace those permanently lost.57 
      According to Lt. Lasky of the 15th Infantry Regiment, the engagement as the Maison 
Rouge “might easily become—and as a matter of fact did become—the distributing point for 
Americans forces pushing to the Rhine.” Many men who served in both Italy and France 
described the engagement at the Maison Rouge as every bit as tough, if not tougher, than the 
landings at Anzio just a year earlier. Even though they faced extreme adversity at the Maison 
Rouge, the men of the 30th and 15th Infantry Regiments were not only able to overcome their 
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losses, but persevered, and continued to carry out their part of “Operation Grand Slam.” Gen. 
O’Daniel, the commander of the 3rd Infantry Division, took full responsibility for the Maison 
Rouge and the disaster at Riedwihr, but was “determined to carry on.”58 
*  *  * 
      As the 3rd Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment struggled at the Maison Rouge, other 
elements of the 15th were just as unfortunate to receive German attacks as well. At around 1200 
hours on the 24th, the 1st Battalion moved across the Ill River and to move south, which put them 
in a position northeast of the Village of Riedwihr. And just like the men of the 30th Infantry 
Regiment, it ended in disaster for them, forcing their withdrawal. “This stunt,” according to Guy 
Rocco, who served in Company B, “in my opinion, was rather stupid. In the middle of the 
afternoon, in broad daylight, we were ordered to withdraw across an open field… We looked like 
a flock of scared sheep running across the field as fast as our legs would carry us.” Other 
companies in the 15th also had similarly bad luck. Both Companies A and C ran into enemy 
infantry and tanks, which resulted in disorganization. Michael Daly, a platoon commander in 
Company A, later said this was his most desperate moment of the entire war, whether to stay and 
fight, or watch his men get killed. Reluctantly, Daly chose to pull his men back. With bridges 
that could support armor finally ready on the morning of January 25, the men of the 1st Battalion 
could now move on Riedwihr. The advance to Riedwihr was slow, however. The men literally 
had to fight their way from tree to tree to advance. Casualties for Company B were horrendous; 
102 men of 120 were either killed or wounded before they even reached their intended positions. 
Out of the 18 men who were not hurt, there was only one officer left. As they reached the edge of 
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the Bois de Riedwihr, what was left of the company now had to defend the position greatly under 
strength. They commenced the arduous process of digging foxholes in the frozen ground. At 
around 1400 hours, six German tanks, along with numerous infantrymen, emerged to attack the 
American lines, with intentions to surround the American positions. Once surrounded, the 
Germans could regain the road which ran from Holtzwihr into the woods behind the 
Americans.59  
Among those Americans who defended the position was a young man who was originally 
too small for the army. His young looks earned him the nickname “Baby.” This boy made a 
name for himself on the battlefield, and eventually earned a battlefield commission, as well as 
numerous other medals and citations. The person in question was Audie Murphy (Fig. 7), the 
only officer from Company B left as before mentioned, who was now, due to attrition, the 
company commander. Murphy saw the need to hold the line at all cost or face the loss of the 
Regimental Headquarters to their rear, where the Germans were directly headed. German fire 
raked his men and knocked out the two tank destroyers there in support. Desperate times called 
for desperate measures. As he ordered his men to fall back, Murphy stayed behind to call out to 
artillery positions in support. When he ran out of ammunition, he proceeded to run, along with 
the phone, to a burning tank destroyer, which still had a functioning machine gun and several 
cases of ammunition. As he climbed on the tank, Murphy noticed the tank commander hanging 
out of the hatch, dead with a wound to the throat. He dragged the body out and dropped him into 
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the snow. Sgt. Elmer Brawley remembered the scene well when he wrote in his report of the 
event. “Silhouetted vividly against the nude trees, dark evergreens, and deep snow, without cover 
of any kind, he stood there, as the flames moved closer to the gasoline tank and ammunition in 
the tank destroyer. All around him, 88mm, and bullets from machine guns, machine pistols, and 
rifles, shook the forests and sent up flurries of snow and dirt.”60 
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Figure 7. Audie Murphy, the most decorated American of World War II. 
 
As he talked to his men by phone, they asked how close the Germans were. “Just hold the 
phone and I’ll let you talk to one of the bastards,” was his response, as the Germans sometimes 
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got to within 10 yards of the tank. Murphy continued to pour fire on the Germans, but also noted, 
“I remember getting the hell shook out of me, but it was nothing new. I also remember for the 
first time in three days my feet were warm.” Murphy managed to hold off the German advance 
as he called down artillery fire dangerously close to his position until the tank destroyer was hit. 
The blast knocked Murphy off the tank and wounded him in the leg. The hit also gave him a 
concussion. But his efforts drove away the German infantry. With the withdrawal of their 
infantry support the German tanks did not push the issue and retreated as well. Murphy, covered 
in dirt and soot, was not finished, however. Brawley later wrote, “Lieutenant Murphy, worn out 
and bleeding profusely, then limped through a continuous hail of fire and brought the Company 
forward. Refusing evacuation, he led a savage attack on the enemy, dislodging the Germans from 
the immediate area. When the fight was over, he allowed his wounds to be treated in the field.”61     
Of the Germans who faced him outside of Holtzwihr, Murphy’s assessment is clear and 
candid when he remembered, “I can understand why the Kraut infantry missed me. But I can 
never forgive the German tank-men for their poor marksmanship. It was real sloppy.” Elmer 
Brawley gives a better reason the infantry missed Murphy. Brawley remembered clearly, “The 
German infantrymen got within 10 yards of Lt. Murphy, who killed them in the draws, the 
meadows, in the woods—wherever he saw them.” Brawley also added in his report of the event 
“Lieutenant Murphy broke the entire attack of the Germans and held the hard-won ground that it 
would have been disastrous to lose.” Anthony Abranski, who also saw Murphy in action, was 
also impressed when he wrote, “The fight that Lieutenant Murphy put up was the greatest display 
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of guts and courage I have ever seen. There is only one in a million who would be willing to 
stand up on a burning vehicle, loaded with explosives, and hold off around 250 raging Krauts for 
an hour and do all that when he was wounded.”62 
      Thanks to the efforts of Audie Murphy, as well as other members of the 15th Infantry 
Regiment, on January 27, a resupplied 30th Infantry Regiment took the town of Holtzwihr. As a 
result, nearly every pocket of resistance east of the Ill River and north of the Colmar Canal 
disappeared.  Phase I of the elimination of the Colmar Pocket was complete for the men of the 
3rd Infantry Division.63 One unit, however, who was new to the ETO, was just getting started in 
the war. If victory was what they wanted, the challenge they had to carry out was pivotal for 
Allied success.
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Chapter 2 
Closing In: Blood and Fire, “Operation Kraut Buster,” and the Seizure of Colmar 
 
The person that is not willing to fight and die, if need be, for his country  
            has no right to life. 
 
                                                                         Col. James Earl Rudder 
Commander, 109th Infantry Regiment 
         January 31, 19451 
 
 
 
      As the Allies pushed their way in the Colmar Pocket, the French citizens kept an eye on 
the events around Colmar. They feared the German salient would become wider due to 
counterattacks. In many of the homes in Alsace, French flags were ready to fly, but the 
inhabitants dared not display them until Colmar was in Allied hands. Many French civilians had 
placed maps on their walls and marked off battles as they were fought. For the French people, 
the Colmar Pocket was not a secondary front.2 
From January 22 to January 26, 1945, the Colmar Pocket offensive proved some of the 
most intense fighting the U.S. troops faced in the ETO. The second phase further tested the 
Americans soldier’s fighting ability. The adversity they faced was equally challenging as what 
they had faced in the previous days. Colmar and the Neuf-Brisach fortress remained in German 
hands. Both required capture if the Allies truly wanted to eliminate the Colmar Pocket. 
Compared to the 3rd Infantry Division, nicknamed “The Rock of the Marne” in World 
War I and entering its fifth campaign of World War II, the men of the 254th Infantry Regiment, 
                                                             
1 Message to the 109th Infantry Regiment upon the execution of Private Eddie Slovik. Quoted in Harry Kemp. The 
Regiment: Let the Citizens Bear Arms! A Narrative History of an American Infantry Regiment in World War II 
(Austin: Nortex Press, 1990), 308. See also Thomas M. Hatfield, Rudder: From Leader to Legend (College Station: 
Texas A&M Press, 2011), 247. 
2 Edgar B. Mooney, Seventh United States Infantry Regiment: 22 January-8 February 1945: The Colmar Pocket  
(Seventh U.S. Army, March 1945), 51. 
  
50 
 
which normally made up part of the 63rd Infantry Division, were new to the conflict in Europe. 
Camp Van Dorn, Mississippi, was the home of the 63rd (motto: “Blood and Fire”) until August 
1944, the where it was responsible for advanced infantry training for soldiers fresh out of boot 
camp. After the Normandy invasion, however, the army decided to activate the entire division as 
a fighting unit to end the war in Europe as quickly as possible. To maximize manpower, the 
army dissolved the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP), which contained men with 
above average IQs. As a result, many of these ASTP men found themselves in the 63rd Infantry 
Division, which subsequently became known as the “smart division.” 3   
The 254th Infantry Regiment, which soon found themselves attached to the 3rd Infantry 
Division, arrived in Marseille on December 8, 1944. While many in the division expected a mild 
Mediterranean climate, only frigid winter temperatures greeted them. As the regiment moved 
further inland, their training regimen intensified to prepare the men for combat. On December 
28, the 254th was temporarily attached to the 3rd Infantry Division for active duty. Pvt. Harris 
Peel, who later wrote the memoirs of the regiment, described the hardships of preparing for 
combat when he said, “An old soldier would have recognized us instantly as what we were: a 
fresh, green outfit ‘going up’ for the first time.” Despite their inexperience, the men never 
stopped learning, and they were lucky enough to have excellent teachers. Throughout the period 
before the offensive, veterans of the 3rd Infantry Division were always there and made sure the 
men learned what they needed to know, and what to expect in combat. Peel adds, “If we became 
seasoned fighters in less time than the average regiment, it was probably due to the interest taken 
by us in this organization.” Col. James Hatcher, who served as executive officer of the regiment, 
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agreed: “The majority of officers and men made every effort to be as helpful as possible in 
indoctrinating our officers and soldiers with their methods of combat tactics and practices.”4 
      On January 20, two days before “Operation Grand Slam” was set to begin, the 254th 
Infantry Regiment learned where their first combat would take place. Their target was Hill 216, a 
well-defended hill in the northern section of the Colmar Pocket, about four miles north of 
Colmar. One soldier described the defensive position there: “Hill 216 sits immutably sentinel 
600-800 feet above the valley floor in the heart of the Colmar Plain.” The 1st Battalion, the 
designated assault battalion of the regiment, would lead the attack. They moved to the north bank 
of the Weiss River, then eastward to the Fecht River. The 2nd Battalion was to hold a defensive 
line, and 3rd Battalion made up the reserve.5  
As attack orders filtered through the ranks, the men deliberated on the plan of attack. 
Some believed the attack on the hill might endanger the regiment’s right flank by the Chateau de 
Schoppinwihr, the mansion the Germans converted into a defensive position. The chateau was in 
the 7th Infantry Regiment’s line of attack, and 254th believed they would have a clear opening to 
carry out the flanking attack once the 7th achieved their objective. Despite the confidence of 
some in the unit, others noted two previous attacks on Hill 216 ended unsuccessfully. During the 
preparation, word came that combat medics should not accompany the attack. “It takes a long 
time to train a medic,” John Pribram, an aid man in the 254th remembered, “and headquarters did 
                                                             
4 Quoted in Peel, The Trail of the 254th, 8, 13; James Hatcher, Blood and Fire: With the 63rd Infantry Division In  
World II (63rd Infantry Division Association, 1986), 20 
5 Quoted in Peel, Trail of the 254th, 15; Robert Ross, We Fought for Peace: World War II Memoirs, 23; 254th  
Infantry Regiment, Attack on Jebsheim by the 254th Infantry Regiment, 63rd Infantry Division, (UCMH: U.S.  
Army Heritage and Education Center, printed June 3, 1945), 1. 
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not want unnecessary losses.” Not wanting to abandon the men who needed them, the medics 
ignored the order and stayed with the men throughout the attack.6 
      Even though the 3rd Infantry Division’s advance began in the late evening of January 22, 
the attack on Hill 216 did not start until the following morning. At 0700, 3rd Infantry artillery 
fired on the German positions to soften them up for the assault. As the big guns shelled the 
hillside, the men of the 254th waited in the snow to move out. At the signal, the troops moved 
forward into their first taste of combat. The men were soon under attack, but they could not tell 
what direction the German attacked from since there were no sounds of shells or mortars flying 
through the air. There was only the sound of explosions and screams. Then reality sank in. The 
men had walked straight into a field of Schu-mines. The recent snow had covered all traces of 
the mines, as well as the footprints of the German soldiers who laid them. As the two companies 
moved forward, they had to slowly advance with every footstep and probe for explosives. 
Finding Schu-mines was difficult, regardless of the winter conditions. Placed inside a small 
wooden box, the mine contained 200 grams of TNT, capable of inflicting serious damage, such 
as severed legs or a wound to the groin. The only metal was in the detonator, undetectable by the 
technology used at the time.7 
The medics rushed in as soon as the mines started exploding. “Now my job as a medic 
began,” John Pribram later wrote. “I was helping someone when I heard a scream. I rushed 
through the fog in the direction of the dying man. On the way I stepped on a ‘Schu-mine’ and 
                                                             
6 Peel, Trail of the 254th, 1; John C. Pribram, Horizons of Hope: An Autobiography (Tulsa: Holbrook Printing,  
1991), 29. 
7 Hatcher, Thru Blood and Fire, 25, Peel, Trail of the 254th, 15-17; German Explosive Ordnance (Washington DC:  
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was blown into the air.” Pribram realized he was seriously wounded and quickly tried to assess 
the state of his injury. He feared passing out, and could only wait in the snow for help. He knew 
his own aid station had standing orders to avoid the minefield. The mines had been laid so 
extensively that even captured German soldiers said they were unable to retrieve those men 
wounded placing the mines. As the sun rose, this slow crawl made American troops especially 
susceptible to German fire, now alerted to the attack by the exploding mines.8  
Col. Hatcher described this movement with the precise recollection of a combat soldier:  
Each infantryman crawling forward in utter loneliness with the feeling of isolation 
from the world realized that the job could not be done in a matter of minutes or 
even hours, and that, to reach the objective, he must continue to endure punishment 
until, inch by painful inch, he could crawl and shoot his way across that hill.9 
       
     As the excruciatingly slow attack continued, the Germans poured their fire into the crawling 
Americans. Command soon gave the order to abandon the frontal assault. They instead decided 
to work their way to the south of Hill 216. From here the advancing companies came under 
attack from the chateau, which clearly had not been distracted by the 7th Infantry Regiment. As 
the Germans hammered the left flank of the 1st Battalion, Company A, on the right flank, had 
better luck despite the Schu-mines and mortars. German fire sliced through the men, but 
Company A pressed on. As superior firepower by the GIs tore into the enemy, the company 
pushed their way to the top of Hill 216 by 0900. The Americans then proceeded down the south 
slope where they found even greater enemy resistance. Despite many casualties, the men made it 
down the slope by 1230. Company A had been totally depleted. They dug in and were unable to 
move without sustaining further casualties.10 
                                                             
8 Pribram, Horizons of Hope, 29; 254th Infantry Regiment, Attack on Jebsheim, 4; Peel, Trail of the 254th, 17. 
9 Hatcher, Thru Blood and Fire, 26. 
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      Despite the hard fight and heavy casualties, the 254th’s assault on Hill 216 was a success. 
They had killed dozens of Germans soldiers and captured 44 more. In victory, the men of the 
regiment now felt what it was like to experience battle. This reflection on the action was best 
described by Pvt. Peel:  
The night following our first attack came and suddenly all the death we had seen, 
the noise we had heard, the fear we had felt descended on us like an avalanche, 
leaving us cold and wet and exhausted. Even through our tiredness we realized that 
each of us was wiser than he had been the day before. We knew that battle was not 
glorious; we knew that we had been through something that none of us would ever 
be able to adequately describe.11  
 
      The French 1st Army named the hill “Bloody Mountain.” Col. Hatcher adds, “Remember, 
this was the first big league action of the regiment and it was made against a position which had 
been thoroughly fortified, wired and mined for defense.” As a testament to the courage of the 
men on the assault on Hill 216, by late afternoon of January 23, reports began to arrive that 
approximately 80% of the combat medics within the two battalions who participated in the 
assault were casualties, many because of their efforts to reach the wounded men trapped in the 
minefields around the hill. John Pribram was one of those men. Stranded for eight hours, GIs 
finally came to his aid. Pribram was in bad shape. He went to a field hospital behind the lines, 
and then to a hospital near Marseille. For his gallantry, Pribram received the Silver Star and the 
Purple Heart. The price he paid for those two medals was his leg, which could not be saved.12     
      Other men laid trapped in the minefields overnight as well. Hatcher heard 
communications between a sergeant and a platoon leader over the phone, who begged for help to 
rescue his men. The sergeant, however, told him such men were not available and they had to do 
                                                             
11 254th Infantry Regiment, Attack on Jebsheim, 9; Peel, Trail of the 254th, 20. 
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get the wounded themselves. Hatcher added to this memory by saying, “It is difficult to 
appreciate the helpless feeling one has for listening to such a conversation between men for 
whom you are responsible and about injured and helpless men for whom you are also 
responsible, yet to this day I can think of no better advice than that given by the 1st Sergeant.”13 
      Although the 254th Infantry Regiment moved into a reserve role after the successful 
attack on Hill 216, the 30th and the 15th Infantry Regiments continued to fight across the Ill at 
Maison Rouge across from the 254th. As the other regiments hammered away, 254th soldier Bob 
Ross, armed only with a carbine, kept expecting a German counterattack. Ross said that he “Felt 
naked as a new-born babe with that little short-range carbine.” But the counterattack never came. 
As the 15th Infantry Regiment cleared out most of the resistance east of the Ill River, the path 
was clear for an all-out assault by the 254th on the village of Jebsheim.14  
During peacetime, the usual population of Jebsheim was around 1,000 citizens. Like Hill 
216, the attack on Jebsheim would not be an easy task for the men of the 254th. The Germans 
considered the town a major point in its defensive line and would defend the town accordingly. 
Germans placed defenses with concrete bunkers and pillboxes. They also placed their defensive 
line directly through the center of town. This was in total contrast to American infantry doctrine, 
which stressed defensive lines be placed on the edge of town. If Americans had to fall back, they 
had the luxury of house-to-house fighting through the entire town. For the Germans, they 
believed setting up their line in town was the best defense against Allied armor.15 
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The 254th’s primary goal was to move from their departure line along the Blind River and 
attack with their 1st and 2nd Battalions, with the 3rd held in reserve. Once Jebsheim was secure, 
the regiment planned to move further and take the bridges that spanned the Colmar Canal north 
of the town of Muntzenheim, where the Colmar and Rhine Canal merge. The Germans knew 
Jebsheim’s importance, and they attempted to defend the town. German Gen. Helmut Thumm 
ordered the newly-arrived mountain divisions, fresh from Norway, to the town to hold the 
defensive positions. He also funneled other units into the area as well to assist.16 
      The 1st and 3rd Battalions expected a relatively easy arrival into Jebsheim. They believed 
the 15th Infantry Regiment had effectively cleared out the area. Some thought they would simply 
mop-up sporadic resistance. Shortly after they crossed the Ill River, however, the GIs came 
under German fire before they even reached their line of departure. They quickly regrouped and 
crossed the Blind River. Here they met even more resistance. Company A had to wade across the 
freezing river on a night that was one of the coldest of the winter. Machine gun fire pinned them 
down once they emerged from the river. The actions on their rifles began to freeze. Soon 
weapons from the other companies began to meet the same fate. The men now were practically 
defenseless as they approached the German defenses. As elements of the 1st and 2nd Battalions 
continued to move forward, they became engaged from three directions: The Bois de Jebsheim 
woods to the south, around the village of Grussenheim to the north, and from the defensive 
positions around Jebsheim to the east. The attack soon came to a standstill. In the 2nd Battalion, 
Sgt. Bob Ross of Company G attempted to help a fellow soldier to set up a machine gun. When 
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he suddenly slumped over Ross assumed the man had fallen asleep due to cold and exhaustion, 
but when Ross touched his arm and tried to talk to him, it was clear the man was dead.17  
At 0300, Col. Hatcher received reports the attack had stalled. As he arrived at the scene, 
Hatcher came upon the two battalions which had fallen apart and retreated to the burning 
buildings of the Jebsheim Mill. Dazed soldiers stood around the building with scores of 
wounded—some with frozen limbs. “Warmth seemed to be,” Hatcher later recalled, “the one 
thought remaining in the minds of officers and men.”18  
      Realizing the danger a counterattack posed to the men, Hatcher immediately sprang into 
action. He tore into any officer he could find to get them to emerge from the shock they were in. 
In desperation, some of the men handed Hatcher their frozen weapons for him to un-jam. His 
efforts were just a futile as theirs had been. Despite the state of the weapons, Hatcher concluded 
frozen weapons used as clubs were better than no weapons at all. He then directed the men to 
build defensive positions. Even though the men were no longer under danger of attack for the 
moment, the night they spent outside of Jebsheim was nothing short of excruciating. Pvt. Peel 
described this anguish:  
Undoubtedly, this night was the most miserable the regiment ever experienced. 
Each man carried only one blanket into the attack, and most of these had been 
soaked when we crossed the Blind. All our clothing was wet either from the stream 
or from the snow melted by our body heat as we lay in it. This had now frozen to 
our skin. No fires could be lit. Those of us on guard slept. Somehow, the night 
finally ended.19  
 
                                                             
17 254th Infantry, Attack on Jebsheim 12; Frederick Kroesen and Clayton R. Newell, ed., General Thoughts: Seventy 
Years with the Army. Writings of General Frederick J. Kroesen, United States Army, Retired (Association of the 
U.S. Army,2003),10; Hatcher, Thru Blood and Fire, 32. 
17 Peel, Trail of the 254th, 25; Magnus Froberg, The 63rd Infantry Division Chronicles: June 1943 to September 1945 
(The 63rd Infantry Division Association,1991), 60. 
18 Hatcher, Thru Blood and Fire, 32-33. 
19 Hatcher, Thru Blood and Fire, 33; Peel, Trail of the 254th,25. 
  
58 
 
     As morning came, the men of 1st Battalion faced a new problem, one which plagued U.S. 
Soldiers all over the ETO in the winter of 1944-45: Trench foot. For Michael Daly of Company 
A, 15th Infantry Regiment, recipient of the Medal of Honor for action in the Spring of 1945, “feet 
presented a constant problem.” Trench foot could be a nightmare. The first thing the soldier lost, 
and if he was lucky the only thing, was his toenails. If the trench foot worsened, a GI’s feet 
would turn white, then purple, until they finally turned black. If the situation reached this level, 
the soldier would be unable to walk. Toes were lost in some instances, and feet required 
amputation in the more extreme cases. If the unfortunate patient began to show the symptoms of 
gangrene, doctors had little option but to remove the lower leg. During the winter of 1944-45, 
enough men to fill the ranks of three full infantry divisions (45,000 men) moved off the front 
lines due to trench foot.20  
      Because of trench foot, on the morning of January 26, the entire 1st Battalion, 254th 
Infantry Regiment, fell below the strength of a single company. Company A alone suffered 
100% casualties, either from wounds suffered in combat or trench foot. The rest of the morning 
and afternoon of January 26 the regiment spent improving defensive positions, as well as 
evacuating the wounded.21 
      As January 26 moved into the evening, the regiment planned to assault Jebsheim a 
second time. Due to the intense fire from the Bois de Jebsheim the night before, command 
decided 3rd Battalion should attack into the forest, while the 1st and 2nd Battalions continued in 
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the village. The 3rd Battalion met little resistance as they moved through the forest. Only 
Company K received heavy fire. This caused them to fall back to the village of Reidwihr. As 3rd 
Battalion launched their attack, 1st and 2nd Battalions restarted their assault on Jebsheim. As the 
battalion moved on Jebsheim, they came under fire about 500 yards before they reached the 
German defenses. Like the night before, the battalions faced artillery from 88s, as well as small 
arms from three different directions. The intense fire forced the GIs to crawl along on the ground 
but they managed to make headway, and they eliminated all but one bunker with bazooka fire. At 
last a tank destroyer emerged and took out the remaining bunker from point-blank range.22 
      With the bunkers cleared, the 254th moved into the town. “Like nearly all other villages in 
the Alsace-Lorraine area, Jebsheim consisted of a cluster of farm buildings and residences,” 
recalled Bob Ross. “Many of the houses had cellars and it was here that the remaining village 
residents waited out the siege of battle. [S]ome cellars might have 10, 20, or 30 civilians.” Before 
the battle, the Allies warned civilians to leave the town, but many chose to stay to protect their 
property and livestock. Others simply had nowhere else to go. Even though they hated the 
Germans, many civilians in Jebsheim were skeptical of the Americans. “This area had been 
fought over so many years they were not sure themselves what to believe,” Ross said. “Most 
houses had two flags—French and German. The country in power determined which flag would 
fly.”23  
    At midnight, eight battalions of artillery opened on Jebsheim for fifteen minutes.  One 
soldier noted, “As we watched it seemed as if the village, lying peacefully asleep one moment, 
became nothing but a massive sheet of flame the next.” By 0400, Jebsheim was clear to the 
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upper part of the town square. Company F, utterly exhausted, set up defensive positions in the 
houses. Since there was hardly any action in the southern part of the town, the men believed the 
town was clear, apart from snipers and disorganized fighters. That notion, however, did not last 
long. On the afternoon of the January 27, Company G fought its way into the lower square. 
During the firefight, they faced house-to-house fighting. One thing the Americans noticed about 
the Germans in Jebsheim was their tenacity in the face of death. Col. Hatcher reported numerous 
instances when cornered German soldiers simply shouted, “Heil Hitler!” and continued to fight. 
Hatcher said the soldiers simply threw grenades at the position and moved on. The house-to-
house fighting was exceptionally tenacious. GIs might clear a house and move on, only to have 
the German retake the house and again fire on the Americans. Bob Ross took shelter in a barn 
that traded hands several times over the course of the battle. Taking prisoners inside of the barn, 
Ross noticed one of them was an officer who spoke English. “He was very indignant that we take 
him prisoner,” Ross said. “He said: ‘you Americans have everything. You all have good homes, 
cars, money and everything nice. Now you even have me!’—as if he was any prize to us.” After 
they reached the upper square, Company G began to set up defensive positions. Before they we 
able to get into defensive positions, however, a German counterattack threatened the safety of the 
company. Despite the German effort, overwhelming firepower drove back the counter attack.24 
      The following morning, January 28, a group of French soldiers took it upon themselves to 
go through the town, even though it was not completely secure. As expected, they were unable to 
fight their way through the German defenses. At 1400, Company E resumed the attack on the 
southern section of Jebsheim. They gained ground in the attack and captured 115 German 
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prisoners. At 1700, the Germans launched a counterattack on the company and caused the GIs to 
move back.  Lt. Frederick Kroesen called for white phosphorus on the enemy positions. The 
American soldiers liked white phosphorus because when they fired on an enemy position, it 
usually meant the position was no longer a danger. Once white phosphorus hits open skin, it 
sticks and continues to burn into the tissue, unless the oxygen supply is lost or the phosphorus 
simply burns out. The burns in the tissue can cause severe organ damage, such as heart and 
kidney failure.25 
As the counterattack intensified, casualties mounted everywhere. Everyone who was not 
shooting helped carry the wounded to safety. To add to the chaos, livestock ran everywhere, with 
phosphorus burning into their skin. The level of the fighting in this counterattack was extremely 
intense. Col. Hatcher remembered:  
I talked in the clear over the radiotelephone with Captain “Howdy” Wilcox of our 
Company E which bore the brunt of the German assault. At one time while talking 
with him I asked him what was the cause of the steady popping sound I kept hearing 
over the radio phone. He replied that it was the sound of his pistol shots; that he 
found it necessary to keep shooting with his free hand while he talked because at 
the time the Germans had succeeded in surrounding a considerable number of his 
men in a barn and had set the barn on fire. Of course the conversation was promptly 
discontinued.26 
  
Company G moved up to reinforce and together was able to repulse the attack and 
continue the assault on Jebsheim the next morning. Right before the attack, three Germans 
entered the American lines and demanded the American surrender. They said they knew the 
Americans consisted of only a single company, while the Germans had at their disposal an entire 
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battalion. In response, men in Company E fired into the German position, signaling their answer, 
as well as to begin the last push to take Jebsheim.27  
      To finally defeat the Germans in Jebsheim, the U.S. attackers had to eliminate the 
German ability to resupply and reinforce the town. Beginning at 1130 on the morning of January 
29, elements of the 3rd Battalion moved to the south and bypassed the outskirts of Jebsheim. The 
goal was to take German-held houses around a vineyard south of town. As the attack continued, 
German resistance made things slow for Company I. The situation looked bleak. The American 
attackers then ran into a French tank. After a little persuasion, the tank attacked the German 
strongpoint.28 
      As 3rd Battalion assaulted the vineyard, 1st and 2nd Battalions attacked the last German 
remnants in the town. As the Germans fell back into houses, they massed their fire in the areas 
they still possessed. This caused the 254th to commit all the remaining men in reserve to finally 
take the town. These efforts showed Germans the futility of a continued engagement. Around 
1630(4:30 p.m.), the Germans began to emerge for their positions, first in small groups, but 
eventually in large numbers. The GIs captured round 450 Germans. In the two assaults by the 
254th Infantry Regiment, they took approximately 1,100 German prisoners, at a cost of around 
870 U.S. casualties. Even though a large portion of Jebsheim citizens remained in town, there 
were only five civilian fatalities. One of those killed was an infant girl. She died after every 
attempt by U.S. medics to save her failed.29 
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      Of the prisoners, Bob Ross remembers one small group he had to deal with. They 
captured about 40 Germans, and he and his men lined them up to march when “an 88mm shell 
landed in the middle of them. Those that were not killed scuttled for cover.” Being knocked 
down, Ross was momentarily disoriented. “In the meantime my immediate thoughts were, My 
God, they are getting away from us. We will have to do this all over again,” he said. But he 
worried for nothing. The Germans realized it was only one shell, and they got back into 
formation and ran to the stockade. Ross added, “They wanted out!”30 
      Along with Hill 216, the men of the 254th Infantry Regiment succeeded despite 
overwhelming odds and little combat experience. Even men of the veteran 3rd Infantry Division 
doubted if the 254th could take Jebsheim. The reason the German’s held out in Jebsheim, it was 
later discovered, they used the village as a corps headquarters. The resilience of the regiment was 
best described by a private who took part in the siege by stating, “If you think I was going to stay 
out in some damn foxhole full of snow while the Krauts were living in nice, warm cellars, you’re 
crazy!”31 
      The reason the 254th Infantry Regiment was successful in their first experience of combat 
comes down to two things: willingness and leadership. Lt. Kroesen, who rose to the rank of four-
star general in a long a distinguished career after the war, deals with the two by stating, “Leading 
men in combat is principally a matter of inspiration, deriving willingness to face danger, accept 
risk to accomplish a mission. The greatest challenge in sustaining that willingness over time as 
friends/buddies are lost and the task becomes never ending.”32 For a successful campaign by 
                                                             
30 Ross, We Fought for Peace, 37. 
31 Quoted in Peel, Trail of the 254th, 31. 
32 Clint Thompson, Questionnaire submitted to Frederick Kroesen, Summer 2013. 
  
64 
 
U.S. soldiers, the willingness expressed by Lt. Kroesen had to remain, not only within himself 
but in every man. The Germans were not quite ready to give up. Colmar had to fall. Further west, 
the fortress city of Neuf-Brisach waited. Here the Germans could make a stand, possibly leading 
to a prolonged siege. The question of not how long it would take, but what the cost would be, in 
both material and human lives, was still left unanswered.  
*  *  * 
The difficulty to eliminate the German threat in the Colmar Pocket was still present, 
however, and the need of additional manpower needed addressing. In a call to SHEAF on 
January 22, Gen. Devers asked for more help. “I believe,” he wrote, “SHEAF is now beginning 
to recognize the fact that we are badly overextended and have been fighting with our backs to the 
wall and with not much help.” On January 26, 1945, General Devers oversaw a meeting with 
members of his staff. What he had to say to his subordinates was not good. “[The] Situation on 
the front does not look good. We are not making the progress we should toward the elimination 
of the Colmar Pocket, and this morning it looks as if the Germans were building up a truly big 
force to Capture Strasbourg.” While it is true the progress of the Allied front around Colmar was 
not moving at the speed at which he intended, Devers also had another reason to move forward. 
The following day, Devers met in person with General Eisenhower. “In my conference with 
General Eisenhower,” wrote Devers, “he emphasized the elimination of the Colmar Pocket; [he] 
said it was the one sore in the whole front; that it was his obsession with him to get it out.”33 
Privately, others also believed there were serious problems in the Colmar Pocket. On January 23, 
General George Patton wrote in his diary, “the elimination of the Colmar Pocket seems to have 
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developed into a fiasco. I hope I don’t get sent down there to strike it.” He believed by moving 
divisions from up north out from under his and Omar Bradley’s command that SHEAF was 
doing what the enemy wanted; taking troops from a vital area and transferring them to an “area 
of secondary importance.” Patton also noted Eisenhower confided in him about his opinion of 
Devers when he wrote, “He [Eisenhower] felt handicapped ‘by having to keep Devers under 
him,’ whom he distrusted. I told him I felt the same way about Devers.”34 This could also quite 
possibly explain why Eisenhower told Devers to suspend his plan to cross the Rhine in 
November when Devers had the chance cross. 
Patton was not the only army commander in the field who expressed annoyance with the  
stalemate in the Colmar Pocket. General Omar Bradley, now commanding general of the U.S. 
12th Army Group, was another commander who made his opinions known. When a telephone 
call from the office of Gen. Harold “Pink” Bull, Assistant Chief of Staff of SHEAF, informed 
Bradley four of his divisions needed transfer south to Colmar, he became unglued. Patton, who 
was in a meeting with Bradley at the time, witnessed the entire episode. “For the first time in my 
knowledge he (Bradley) lost his good humor and told Whitely (Pink’s British assistant at 
SHEAF) that if he wanted to destroy the whole operation he could do so and be damned, or 
words to that effect, and take all the corps and divisions,” Patton wrote. Col. Hobart Gay, 
Patton’s Chief of Staff, who was also present at the meeting, also described the incident in his 
diary. He remembered Bradley telling Pink “If you feel that way about it, then as far as I’m 
concerned, you can take any goddamned division and/or corps in the Twelfth Army Group, do 
with them what as you see fit, and those of us that you leave back will set(sic) on our asses until 
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hell freezes over. I trust you do not think I am angry, but I want to impress upon you that I am 
goddamned well incensed.”35 
*  *  * 
Following their initial combat, the 7th Infantry Regiment was moved off the line and 
placed in reserve for some much-needed rest after the intense fighting of the previous few days. 
They were still in foxholes but could go inside warming tents to help thaw out. 88 men left the 
line due to trench foot, but replacements arrived to take their place.36 
 For the rest of the 3rd Infantry Division, it was the same type of business they had 
experienced over the last few days. As the 15th and 30th Infantry Regiments moved farther east, 
they continued to clean up sporadic pockets of resistance up to the Colmar Canal. Late on the 
night of January 28, the division found out that they had been transferred to the flag of the XXI 
Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Frank Milburn.37 This fighting force, which comprised mostly 
American troops, included the 3rd Infantry Division, the 28th Infantry Division, the 75th Infantry 
Division, as well as the 12th Armored Division. 
      Because of the intense fighting of the previous days, the 15th and 30th Infantry Regiments 
had a well-defended bridgehead along the Ill River. The 254th Infantry Regiment had taken 
Jebsheim by this point, along the Rhine-Rhone Canal. Further movement by the 3rd Infantry 
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Division opened the areas south of the Colmar Canal. This canal was the last water barrier the 
Americans faced until they reached the fortress city of Neuf-Brisach, along the Rhine River.38 
      In the late parts of January 27, elements of the 30th Infantry Regiment eliminated 
resistance north of the Colmar Canal. As they advanced, they took fire from positions south of 
the Colmar Canal. This engagement showed the Germans were not quite ready to give in. The 
next afternoon, January 28, a combined French and American tank support succeed to destroy a 
small bridge across the Colmar Canal, used by the Germans to launch counterattacks. The Allies 
succeeded, but at the cost of one French and one American tank.39  
     To the untrained eye, it may seem the destruction of the footbridge was detrimental to the 
Americans, but they had another way to cross the canal. As the sun went down on January 29, 
elements of the 7th and the 15th Infantry Regiments managed to sneak to the edge of the Colmar 
Canal with rubber boats. This was not an easy task due to the traffic jam of French armor and 
U.S. engineers, as well as the command vehicles from 3rd Division Headquarters. The men had to 
split up and make their way around the vehicles, which inevitably delayed the attack. 
Reconnaissance reports stated the canal was fifty feet across and six feet deep. Despite frigid 
temperatures, the men found the canal only partially frozen and moving slowly. Steep sides 
along the canal of up to 10 feet also greeted Americans, with dirty water the consistency of 
slush.40  
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Unlike “Operation Grand Slam,” this movement, known as “Operation Kraut Buster,” 
began with 24 hours of artillery in preparation for the assault. Ultimately the artillery fired 
16,438 rounds. Once across, the mission of the 7th Infantry was to push south along the outskirts 
of Colmar while simultaneously clearing out the Niederwald Woods to the east of the city. A 
smoke screen provided by the artillery would give some concealment. Two continuous days of 
combat for the regiment began.41  
      The men slowly filled their allotment of thirty boats, each loaded down with ten men 
apiece. Once the boats had made it across, they unloaded them as quickly as possible and pulled 
back to the other side by ropes that attached to the boats. As they forded the canal, German small 
arms fire began to open on them, but luckily it was far over their heads and did not inflict any 
real damage42 
      While the 7th Regiment crossed the Colmar Canal at a decent pace, 15th Regiment faced 
problems to the east. The equipment needed to build a bridge to accommodate their armor 
support was not ready, again because of the blocked roads by armor and other vehicles. 
Apparently not wanting another debacle like at the Maison Rouge, Gen. Arthur Young, assistant 
commander of the 3rd Division, called over to the 7th and advised them of the situation, and 
wanted them to halt their action if possible until the 15th could be able to move. Upon the news 
that the 7th was already crossing, Young ordered the 7th to halt. Responding to the order, Lt. 
Colonel C.C. Thobro, the Regimental Executive Officer replied, “If it’s an order I’ll try to stop 
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them,” and he tried to make his way to the crossing site, but was held up by French armor along 
the road. When he arrived at the crossing, Thobro found out the crossing could not be stopped. 
Two full battalions had already made their way across the Colmar Canal. The two battalions, the 
1st and the 3rd, had to wait until the artillery let up before they could make their advance. Before 
them, the town of Bischwihr turned into an inferno from artillery, mortars, as well as white 
phosphorus shells.43 
      The two battalions moved out when the artillery let up. 1st Battalion was to attack the 
town from the north, while 3rd Battalion moved around the outskirts and entered the town from 
the south. As 1st Battalion moved on Bischwihr, enemy fire greeted them from the west. The 
American troops soon encountered Germans dazed from the artillery barrage. These soldiers 
surrendered without any trouble. Additional searches in the northern part of the town yielded no 
resistance.44 
      In the southern part of town, soldiers in the 3rd Battalion had an extremely unusual 
encounter with a group of Germans who surrendered. As they carried out their searches of the 
building, the men of Company L took a group of prisoners who had hidden in a cellar. Like GIs 
all over the ETO, including the Colmar Pocket, the men of the company began to frisked the 
Germans for souvenirs. One man got more than he bargained for. When he searched one 
prisoner, the soldier felt inside the person’s breast pocket. The soldier paused, not quite sure if 
what he felt was real, and then felt again. The reality then set in. “For Christ sake,” the soldier 
exclaimed, “it’s a woman!” As expected, a large group of GIs rushed to and began mingled 
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around the prisoners. Out of the 30 captured, 14 were women. Orville Dilly, the company 
commander, had to break up the scene so the sweep of Bischwihr could continue. Trying to find 
volunteers to escort the prisoners, however, was not an easy task, since there were numerous 
soldiers who were eager to perform the service. These men took their charges and began to move 
off, grinning “from ear to ear.” The 7th secured Bischwihr shortly before midnight on the night of 
January 29. The efforts of the 1st and 3rd Battalions yielded about sixty prisoners, one of whom 
believed the Americans had more artillery than the Germans had rifles.45 
      In the early morning of January 30, the German army attempted a counterattack. The 
attack was quickly repulsed. The Germans fell back into an open field from where they came. 
Soon, Allied mortar fire fell on the fleeing German soldiers, and the Americans could hear their 
screams east of their position. Later that morning, engineers completed a bridge across the 
Colmar Canal. This allowed French armor to cross in support the Americans. The following 
night, January 31, elements of the newly arrived 75th Division relieved the men of the 7th.46 
      Unlike the two battalions of the 7th, the men of the 15th Infantry Regiment had a rather 
easy crossing of the Colmar Canal, making it across around midnight. As Audie Murphy and his 
men moved forward, he noted the immense artillery landing before them. By 0130, elements of 
the regiment had taken the village of Muntzenheim, with the 2nd Battalion moving out and 
seizing the village of Fortschwihr, with minimal effort. Among the 200 prisoners taken was a 
105mm gun, along with the crew, an 88mm with its men, as well as two 120mm mortars. The 
next two days, Murphy made sure his men moved fast, saying, “We must hit the enemy before he 
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can get to his feet.” He and his men were filthy and muddy, and except for the helmets, there was 
little distinction between the Americans and the Germans.47  
Their pitiful appearance came in extremely handy when they dealt with the enemy. “A 
Group of Germans surrenders to my company, they throw their helmets down and stand with 
raised hands while we shake them down,” Murphy remembered. Murphy noted the Germans’ 
state of exhaustion, and he and his men took a rest alongside their prisoners. As they rested, they 
heard tanks approaching-Not American, but German armor. When he realized it was too late to 
run, Murphy eyed the prisoners, who had their heads down and were unaware of the situation. 
Grabbing a German helmet, Murphy placed it on his head. His men did likewise. Three tanks, as 
well as infantry, pass within thirty yards of Murphy and his men. They waved at the Germans, 
who waved back, apparently thinking they were comrades. The tanks continued into the forest 
and disappeared. “I wiped the cold sweat from my forehead,” Murphy remembered, “and thank 
God for mud and exhaustion.”48 
Another soldier of the 15th Infantry Regiment, Sgt. Troy Cox, recalled a similar situation 
with the Germans one of his fellow GIs experienced. Upon getting separated from his unit, the 
soldier approached and entered a camp filled with men. Once he got about halfway in, the soldier 
realized he had walked into a German camp. Unable to turn and run, Cox noted, the soldier had 
enough composure to simply keep walking through to the other side of the camp. He made it out 
and returned to his unit, no worse for wear.49 
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      In another strange encounter with the Germans, however, things did not work out so well 
for some men of the Company B, Audie Murphy’s company. On the outskirts of Fortschwihr, 
Privates Hollace Ditterline and Maurice Minton were setting up a roadblock to prevent the 
Germans from retaking the town. As they worked, they noticed three figures approach their 
position. Ditterline noted, “I don’t know if God talks to people, but I think he told me to tell 
Minton ‘don’t trust em’.” Minton disregarded Ditterline, however, and went out to meet the men, 
telling Ditterline that Murphy was sending them three men to help. As they got closer, Ditterline 
realized they were German. It was too late. The Germans swung their weapons up and killed 
Minton, along with a sergeant who went out with him. “I knew the minute they shot Minton that 
he was dead,” Ditterline said. “When a guy is killed, he’ll fall a certain way that is almost 
unnatural; he’ll fall with his arm crooked underneath him. And that’s what Minton did.” With his 
friend dead, emotions overcame Ditterline. “When your friends get killed,” recalled Ditterline, 
“you get kind of angry. I shot all three of those Germans with my M-1, killing two and wounding 
another one. I would have finished off the injured soldier, except my gun was empty.”50 
*  *  * 
      While the first two Battalions of the 7th and the entire complement of the 15th Infantry 
Regiments quickly achieved their objectives, the 2nd Battalion of the 7th faced a serious challenge 
as they attacked towards the town of Wihr-en-Plaine. The sun had set by the time the men made 
the attack, and the Germans they expected to encounter on the outskirts of town were not there.  
Because the bridge they needed to bring armor support had not been built yet, armor did not 
follow them. As the men moved cautiously, everything seemed uneasy. Pvt. Earl Reitan 
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remembered, “There was an eerie silence, broken only by the crunching of boots on the snow 
and the whispering American shells overhead.” Maj. Jack Duncan, the 2nd Battalion commander, 
also experienced apprehension. “It was too easy,” he said. “I felt like we were walking into 
something.”51 
Maj. Duncan could not have been more correct about the situation. On the outskirts of 
Wihr-en-Plaine, the Germans saw their chance and attacked with infantry, supported by two tank 
destroyers. “Apparently, the enemy knew that we did not have our armor over the canal and had 
laid a trap,” Earl Reitan remembered. Despite the white blankets and mattress covers the 
Americans used as camouflage, the Germans had little trouble seeing them in the moonlight. As 
they fired, the Americans tried desperately to dig into the frozen ground. Around 15 men died. 
Other wounded men were helpless as the tanks approached and fell into the path of the tanks 
treads and were crushed. All their fellow soldiers could do was listen to their screams. One of the 
enemy tank destroyers then stopped. In English, they called out for those in the foxholes to 
surrender. The fighting was too much for some of the men, who emerged from the foxholes with 
their hands raised. German machine gunners promptly opened fire. Those not killed crawled 
their way back to the foxhole. Others attempted to take cover in foxholes, but some fell in the 
snow wounded. The German tanks did not stop. Screams again could be heard as the Germans 
ran over the wounded. Out in the field, some of the men who were part of the OP (outpost), had 
taken cover behind mounds of frozen manure. Maj. Duncan later noted, “That’s one time ‘Tough 
Shit’ came in handy.”52  
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 The surviving men of Companies F and G ran for cover in the town. Pvt. Retain recalled, 
“When I saw the German TD’s (tank destroyers) I took off as fast as I could manage in the deep 
snow with my heavy load. When I reached the village, my heart was pounding and my lungs 
burning.” He soon reached a stone wall and took cover. Other men did the same, and they called 
out to each other to get reorganized. Another soldier, Pfc. Ernie Boyd from Company G also 
experienced the utter willpower it took to get into town. “Running in that snow was hell, and 
really I went sort of like a rabbit,” he remembered. “I was nearly done in. I felt like I was 
sucking in pure fire by the time I came to a low stone wall that I fell on and rolled over.”53 
      Company E was not as fortunate. They were still pinned down outside of town. As 
machine gun fire continued, German tank destroyers moved to flank them. In desperation, Lt. 
George Kite called for artillery. When told to wait, he screamed into the radio “I want this fire 
more than I’ve ever wanted anything in all my life.” The artillery finally came, but it did no 
good. The German armor continued to approach. As the situation looked bleak, Major Duncan 
called for bazooka teams from Company E to engage the tank destroyers. Crawling to the 
position of the manure piles, the bazooka men fired at the tank destroyers. Duncan could hear the 
men as they prayed for a hit. But their prayers went unanswered as their shot missed. The 
German armor returned fire, and they managed to kill one of the two-man bazooka teams and 
knocked the other down. They got up cussing but continued to fire. Thing got frantic when Pvt. 
Joseph Bale turned to Major Duncan and said, “Well, sir, here goes the last round.” This was not 
an easy shot. Estimates put the tank out to 500 feet—well beyond the range of the weapon. As 
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the round left the tube, no one spoke because they knew their lives depended on Bale’s aim. 
“Years seemed to pass,” Maj. Duncan noted. But they did not need to fear. The men broke into 
cheers when the round struck one of the tank destroyers, which exploded into flames. “The 
soldiers could not restrain themselves,” Maj. Duncan remembered. “They yelled at the top of 
their lungs. Some unashamedly wept for joy.” As the men celebrated, the other German tank 
destroyer picked up the survivors, who were rolling in the snow to put out their clothes on fire. 
The Americans wanted to fire upon the crew of the tank destroyer, but with no more bazooka 
rounds, they decided not to draw attention to themselves.54  
Even though this had been in mid-combat, Maj. Duncan used this as a learning 
experience.  Duncan stated, “I think it is important to note that, at last, the men had seen a 
bazooka stop a tank in battle. They had seen what a bazooka would do to a tank during training 
periods, but it took a real battle to convince them. From then on my men did not hesitate to fight 
tanks with bazookas.”55 The men soon moved into Wihr-en-Plaine. Their hands and feet were 
now frozen or nearly so. As they moved, they captured three Germans. Due to the firefight that 
had just taken place, the Germans thought their lives were over. Pvt. Dale Schumacher 
remembered, “The three German prisoners were very scared. They took family pictures from 
their pockets and held them out to us. I’m sure they felt we were going to kill them on the spot.” 
The GIs fought their way into the center of town and cleared houses one by one. They then held 
the town throughout the early morning.56  
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Other men of 2nd Battalion entered the town just as the Germans counterattacked. The 
attacking force included two Mark VI tanks and the equivalent of a company of infantry. On the 
east side of town and still out of bazooka ammunition, the men of Company E used rifle fire to 
keep the Germans outside of town. On the other side of town another Mark VI tank, as well as 
sixty men attacked. Unlike before, the bazooka men here had ammunition and could push the 
tanks back. The German infantry continued their advance, but rifle fire drove them into sheds for 
cover. Once they were in the sheds, the bazooka teams let loose. Despite the fire, three Germans 
in a Volkswagen rolled up, and American machine gun fire severed the driver’s head from his 
body. The Volkswagen crashed, killing the other two men.57   
Maj. Duncan ordered his men into buildings, and then called down artillery fire into the 
town. The shells exploded around the Germans, and American small arms fire prevented them 
from getting inside any houses. “The early morning light was brightened by the exploding 
shells,” one American soldier remembered. “German bodies were mangled when the barrage 
landed. Enemy voices screamed with pain. Germans writhed on the streets in their own blood 
while…shells continued to cut through their clothes and flesh.” Pvt. Bale, resupplied with 
bazooka rounds, continued his fire once inside the buildings. He aimed for one of the Mark VI 
tanks that entered the town. To speed up his fire, Bale attempted to load the bazooka by himself, 
which is the job of two men. As he placed the rocket into the tube, it slipped all the way through 
and exploded as it hit the floor, blowing both of his legs off. Bale died from his wounds. Not 
only was he killed, but the explosion wounded 17 other men. The tank continued to move 
forward. As Pvt. Reitan took cover, he said:  
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I took cover in a house with three or four others in my squad, but not before the tank driver 
saw us. We heard the clanking sound of the tank as it approached, then silence, as the tank 
stopped in front of the house. The tank fired one shot into the side of the house. The room 
filled with dust and debris, and there was a hole in the stone wall about a foot above the 
floor. Miraculously no one was killed or wounded, apart from cuts and abrasions. Whoever 
had built that house had built it to last, but certainly he had never imagined that it would 
have to withstand a German 88 fired at point blank range. I heard the tank proceed down 
the street and then an explosion.58 
 
 That explosion was the result of another bazooka crew taking out the tank. Pvt. Ernie 
Boyd had loaded the round for his partner, Pvt. Ernest Hallmark. “Hallmark put the round 
squarely into the engine,” Boyd remembered. “And I was stunned by the fire that occurred.” 
American troops killed all the Germans as they abandoned the burning tank. As he looked back, 
Boyd wondered if he had done the right thing. “I have often regretted that we did not take 
prisoners,” he later lamented. As the morning of January 30 wore on, 2nd Battalion held their 
ground in Wihr-en-Plaine. The Germans launched additional counterattacks, but the American 
forces managed to hold Wihr-en-Plaine.59 
      The 7th Infantry Regiment rested in Wihr-en-Plaine for the time being, hoping they could 
get an extended rest. But this was not the case. Gen. O’Daniel, the commander of the 3rd Infantry 
Division, called forward and ordered the men of the 2nd Battalion to take the city of Horbourg, 
which was 200 yards away across an open field. “Horbourg must be taken by noon,” O’Daniel 
ordered. This objective was of extreme significance since it was a suburb of Colmar. The seizure 
of Horbourg meant the roads that lead from Colmar to Neuf-Brisach would be in Allied hands. 
At this point, the 2nd Battalion had dwindled down to about thirty men per company. Command 
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picked Company E to lead the assault, with American armor in support. This was not an easy 
task, a fact not lost on Col. John Heintges, commanding officer of the 7th, when he called Gen. 
O’Daniel and said, “Horbourg is a sticky deal.” Heintges let O’Daniel know he was having 
trouble with the French to coordinate the attack. O’Daniel told him “Continue to hit Horbourg 
and I’ll get the French to push also.”60  
At about 2200(10 p.m.) that night, part of an armored infantry battalion of French 
appeared. The men were loud, and American Earl Reitan feared their volume would draw 
unwanted attention. They appreciated the additional armor, but the French in the tanks would not 
support the assault until the roads junctions were clear. Maj. Duncan proceeded to argue about 
the need for the armor, but the French commander would not concede. Company E, along with 
one American tank, moved to the outskirts of Horbourg, where German machine-gun nests 
opened on them. The tank fired upon the buildings and machine gun nests.61 
The infantry began to take the buildings while other men of the 2nd Battalion followed 
Company E forward. They sent a runner back to get another American tank. It soon appeared and 
fired upon the German positions. At this point, the Americans held one side of the main street 
while the Germans held the other side. This situation lasted all night. Pvt. Schumacher, who was 
held up in a house, remembered the Germans “came in after us but we were able to drive them 
off. We moved back away from the street and finally ended up in the basement.” Earl Reitan 
remembered the Germans attempted to take the American side of the street. He was upstairs in a 
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building when another soldier noticed a German helmet trying to look around a corner. The 
soldier fired, but the bullet ricocheted off the corner, and the helmet retreated. The German 
reappeared again and fired upon Reitan and his men. Reitan’s sergeant told he and his men to 
move into the next house. Maj. Duncan later reported the Germans would not move.62  
When the sun rose on the morning of January 31, the situation had not been resolved. In 
desperation, Maj. Duncan did the only thing he could think of to get the French armor into the 
fight: he lied to them and told them the crossroad was secure. This annoyed the French, but they 
attacked anyway after a short artillery barrage. Fortunately for Duncan, the French met little 
resistance. American infantry joined to drive the Germans out. By nightfall, German defenses 
around Colmar were largely eliminated. Soldiers in the 2nd Battalion were now on their third day 
without sleep. Food and supplies were gone. The famished men had to scrounge in the houses 
they searched to find something to eat. On January 31, the newly arrived the 75th Division 
relieved the 2nd Battalion. From January 29 to January 31, the 7th Infantry Regiment captured 365 
prisoners and inflicted an estimated 400 casualties. Casualties were 39 killed and 77 wounded.63 
 The capture of Horbourg was the end of the road for Earl Reitan. “I was totally 
exhausted,” Reitan wrote, “and along with eight or ten others I was sent to the rear where they 
had a camp to give soldiers some rest and decent meals.” To add to the exhaustion, Reitan had 
carried on the offensive with a bad knee. Complaining to a doctor about his knee Reitan can still 
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remember him saying, “You’ve had enough of this, son.” Elation overcame Reitan. “Heart 
rejoiced,” he wrote, “for I knew that I would live.”64 
*   *   * 
      As Horbourg fell, the city of Colmar itself was under the threat of Allied attack. The 28th 
Infantry Division and French forces were ordered to take the city. Before their assignment to the 
Colmar Pocket, the 28th Division operated north of the pocket in Belgium and assisted in driving 
back the bulge in the Ardennes. With manpower shortages all over the ETO, however, 
Eisenhower had no choice but to send them south. Official reports stated the 28th Division was 
capable of “limited offensive action.” In the middle of winter, they traveled to Colmar by train 
on frigid French “forty and eights” railcars from World War I, made to hold forty men or eight 
horses.65 Attempting to make the voyage in secret, William Pena, from Laredo, Texas, an officer 
in the 109th Infantry Regiment, remembered, “We were told to cover up our insignia, we had a 
keystone, representing the 28th Infantry Division from Pennsylvania, we were going to go 
incognito into the Colmar area.” But Pena also conceded the plan backfired. “When we got there, 
the Germans ran a message to us: ‘Welcome the 28th Infantry Division!’ They knew exactly who 
we were!”66 The division was not be put into reserve, however, but be put right into combat. The 
men of the 109th Infantry Regiment, however, were not aware of this, and when the orders came, 
they were a complete surprise.  
      February 1 was payday for the 109th. Pena recalled, “At three o’clock in the afternoon 
when we were only halfway through paying the men, an order for a night attack came down to 
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the company. We were going into Colmar!” Payday would have to wait. “After all the lengthy 
procedures in obtaining the payroll that morning,” Pena remembered, “I practically dumped the 
moneybag at headquarters and drove as fast as I could back to the company.”67 Another officer 
of the 109th, M. Bedford Davis M.D., shared Pena’s opinion when he wrote:  
Our vision of sleep was shattered by the arrival of a courier at 2350, requesting that 
I come to the regimental CP. Once there, Col. Rudder informed us that a combat 
patrol had been sent out to curvet the land and the disposition of enemy troops about 
Colmar. They had reported back that the Germans were asleep across the barrels of 
their 88s. This gave us the only opportunity we had ever known to make a surprise 
attack on the enemy. We were to march to Colmar immediately. Fatigue and elation 
fought for domination in every man on the regimental staff, but we were soldiers, 
and an order was an order.68  
      
The attack began as a disorganized effort. From their position, Pena and his men had to 
cross a forest to reach the outskirts of Colmar. It was pitch black by the time his men had entered 
the forest. Capt. Bruce Paul, commander of Company I, was in the lead, with Pena, who was the 
executive officer, at the rear to prevent stragglers. During the march, Paul moved a little too fast, 
and word reached Pena they had become separated. Retracing their steps, he found where they had 
lost Paul, and reinitiated contact. Paul, who had already committed half of the company, was not 
pleased, asking Pena “Where in the hell have you been?” The company began to receive fire. Pena 
and Paul both landed next to another officer. When one of the men made a noise, the officer raised 
his head and promptly got hit. “He began to moan and make all kinds of noises,” Pena said. “I kept 
telling him, ‘Could you hold it down?’ It’s funny, he’s dying, but you are worried about the men 
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hearing that. When your men hear people wounded, it’s very demoralizing, and you try to avoid 
that.”69  
As they reached a vineyard on the outskirts of town, Pena had to divide up his men in the 
rows to navigate. Not finding any resistance, they emerged from the vineyard to find the highway 
to Colmar. As they marched down the highway, units regrouped and moved to a row of trenches 
as they approached Colmar. They assumed the trenches would be manned with German defenders. 
Once they reached the trenches, however, they found them deserted.70    
The 109th moved with extreme haste. This was on par with the type of training Col. 
James Rudder, the commander of the 109th Infantry Regiment, had implemented for his anti-tank 
units. Rudder basically trained his anti-tank units in the way of the Army Rangers. Rudder had 
been in command of the 2nd Ranger Battalion on D-Day when his Rangers scaled the cliffs at 
Point-du-Hoc. They were also trained in night operations. This company, called the Raider 
Company, led the 109th Regiment into Colmar, and they went faster than originally planned. This 
led to friendly artillery being dropped on their position. Pena remembered the artillery observer 
calling back to cease-fire. They had no idea the regiment moved up so fast.71 
      The 109th engaged in street fighting on the outskirts of Colmar. Germans fired and then 
dispersed, running through the streets.  As they entered town French armor overtook them. In an 
act of diplomacy, Col. Rudder stopped his regiment to allow the French to enter the city first. 
Pena and his men, their objective complete, entered a home and literally collapsed around the 
kitchen table, too tired to move.72 Their rest did not last long, Pena recalled:  
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A tank rattled by shortly afterwards. There was the sound of a huge explosion. We 
went to the door to see. A French driven tank had been hit by an anti-tank gun. As 
the tank commander tried to get out, a sniper picked him off. A French ambulance 
came whizzing down the street as if to an auto accident. An aid man got out and 
climbed the tank. The sniper’s bullet dropped him to the ground. A French nurse 
in coveralls got out of the ambulance. She carried the aid man towards the 
ambulance where other hands took over. Then she climbed the tank, took the 
commander out of the turret, and methodically took him off the tank and carried 
him to the ambulance. She went back into the tank but came back without 
comment. The sniper had gallantly spared her.73   
 
By 1130 the French armor succeeded to reduce the German resistance. By 1145 there was 
only scattered resistance in the city and by 1600(4 p.m.) the city of Colmar was mostly in Allied 
hands.  The cost to the 109th Infantry Regiment was relatively light despite the seriousness of the 
mission: 125 men killed, wounded, or missing. The 109th set up a defensive perimeter south of 
the city in case of a German counterattack.74 
      Those inside the city were not out of danger, however. Bedford Davis recalled an 
instance when he arrived in Colmar to set up his aid station inside a very nice building. Davis 
remembered: 
“this paradise” evaporated just two hours later when French corps generals, under 
whom we were operating, told our colonel his command post was too plush. They 
made our regiment move out so they could move in. As fate would have it, word of 
this CP location had somehow drifted across the Rhine River and into the Black 
Forest. Within 45 minutes of our move to a spot about a mile away the Germans, 
known to have a 240mm railroad gun operating in the area, fired this huge gun 
twice. Both shells made direct hits on the buildings now occupied by the French 
corps and they ceased to exist for the moment.75  
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     The residents of Colmar were for the most part elated at the idea of being liberated and 
celebrated for many hours. Many read the passage written, by Marshal Lattre de Tassigny, 
commander of the French 1st Army: 
Inhabitants of Colmar! After four years and a half of oppression and suffering, four 
years and a half of a separation so cruel to our hearts, your city has found the 
motherland and the tricolour(sic) once more. 
United in brotherhood, the French of the 5th Armoured (sic) Division and the 
infantry of the American divisions have today, the 2nd of February, entered the city 
of Colmar, which our maneuvre(sic) has sought to spare from the destruction of 
battle.76 
  
      But others had different views about Colmar. Conflicting reports emerged from the city 
as to local feelings about liberation. Richard Johnston, a combat correspondent for the New York 
Times, said the citizens of Colmar were oddly reserved in their behavior. Johnston observed the 
French soldiers enjoyed the liberation of the city more than its citizens since it was French 
soldiers who took down the German street markers. One Texas soldier who Johnston interviewed 
was similarly dismayed, saying, “They don’t seem to give a damn. They don’t seem to appreciate 
how lucky this burg is. Why, we didn’t even throw in artillery!”77  A major question is why did 
the French citizens not show any emotion? Like the citizens all over Alsace, they were possibly 
afraid the American takeover was a temporary one, as well as the fear of reprisal against German 
collaborators was enough to not show any emotion. But memory can be a powerful thing. One 
person might observe one situation, while someone else may experience the exact opposite. 
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One American had a positive, if embarrassing, experiences. After setting up their triage 
area for wounded, Bedford Davis had his first interaction with hot water in a while and decided 
to take a bath. Davis remembered:  
I hastily stripped off layer after layer of wool clothing we had to wear in the cold 
winter weather in order to survive. Right in the middle of my bath, a nurse walked 
into the room and announced it was dark enough to need the blackout curtains to 
be pulled. Much to my embarrassment, she managed to stay about thirty minutes 
making animated conversation. She did not seem to notice my lack of clothing. She 
had nothing in mind except to express the gratitude of the townspeople toward the 
liberators. 
Additionally, regarding the townspeople, Davis mentioned:  
Each of our rooms had a good hospital bed and we anticipated the best night’s 
sleep in many months. However, we did not get to go to bed very early. The 
townspeople plied us with a hero’s welcome just as we had been given in Paris, 
but on a slightly smaller scale. The mayor and town council welcomed us to the 
city hall. As part of the regimental staff, I was required to attend the festivities.78  
  
      Even though Colmar was in the hands of the Allies, Capt. Pena still had to deal with 
Germans. This occurred on the morning of February 3 when a priest came and talked to a baker 
with whom Pena stayed with. As he translated for the priest, the baker said there were over 
twenty German soldiers in a nearby cellar who wished to surrender. As Pena arrived at the cellar, 
he noticed the Germans were reluctant to come out fearing reprisal, but they slowly emerged 
from their hiding place. The Americans began to frisk them. During the event, a group of nuns 
spoke to the prisoners and soon pleaded with Pena not to take the soldiers’ personal belongings. 
Pena told the sergeant not to take their things. This action satisfied the nuns.79  
      Bedford Davis also had an interesting encounter with a German prisoner. Davis 
witnessed a German Focke-Wolfe 190 fighter plane shot down by American P-47s. The pilot 
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managed to eject and parachuted to within a few feet of their aid station, where he was quickly 
captured. While they waited for an escort to move the new prisoner, Davis and his fellow 
Americans made small talk with the pilot. What struck them most was the pilot said that he did 
not think much of American soldiers and could not figure out how the Americans were winning 
battles. Despite their best efforts to dissuade him, Davis said the pilot was adamant Germany 
would win the war in the end. 80  This type of behavior is understandable; Despite things going 
so badly for the Germans, the pilot still believed in victory, no matter the situation. If the 
situation was reversed, one could argue Davis might have behaved in the same manner in the 
face of inevitable defeat. 
*  *  * 
      Reciprocity was also prevalent after the liberation of Colmar. Brendan Phibbs, a combat 
surgeon in the 12th Armored Division, arrived in Colmar the day after liberation. He traveled in 
the back of an ambulance along with a psychiatric patient, who spent his trip curled up in the 
fetal position. As his column tried to make their way through the sea of people, Phibbs came 
across eight soldiers from Senegal, under French command. Wondering what these men were 
doing, it dawned on Phibbs that they were a firing squad. “Who were they shooting this soon,” 
Phibbs wondered. “They just took the damned city.” When it became clear they were executing 
Nazi collaborators, Phibbs passed the information on to the other Americans gathered around. 
They stood there stunned. One man said, “Christ, we just took the place.” Other members 
responded: “They don’t screw around with lawyers, these guys.” Not wanting to witness the 
sight, Phibbs proceeded back to his ambulance. There he they asked Phibbs how a person would 
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know whom to shoot. To their surprise, the psychiatric patient answered it for them, saying, 
“When they have traitors for next-door neighbors, of course they know who to shoot. Wouldn’t 
you?” After coming out of his daze, Phibbs noted the man “stuffed his fingers back into his 
mouth and went back to his frozen contemplation.”81 
*  *  * 
 Unfortunately, instances such as the psychiatric patient were not uncommon during the 
war because of the stress, as well as being away from loved ones. Troy Cox remembers a young 
Texan who was head over heels in love with his girl back home, whom he constantly talked 
about. One day, Cox noticed the man was unusually withdrawn. When asked, he said his girl had 
sent him a “Dear John” letter telling him she was going to marry another man. Their efforts to 
cheer the man up failed. The next time they went into combat, the handsome Texan walked right 
into the incoming German fire. His death really affected Cox and his men.82 
As the stress mounted, the need to keep morale up during the war was constantly present 
when Cox talked about one of his friends in the 15th Infantry Regiment, Pfc. Sam Tapp from 
South Carolina. “In almost every platoon there was a boy who never worried, at least on the 
outside,” he remembered. In Cox’s platoon, that person was Tapp, who always seemed to say the 
right thing at the right time which put the men at ease, whether humorous or insightful. His 
outward appearance, however, hid the pain Tapp experienced, whose hair turned completely gray 
from stress. Other men, such as platoon member James Elling, held onto the thought of his wife 
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back home. “Just the thought of getting back to you is all I’m living for now,” he wrote. 
“However, I think that I have lived through hell on earth.”83 
                                                            *  *  * 
The presence of the African colonials, in the case of the Senegalese soldiers executing the 
French collaborators, brings another issue to the forefront; this was truly a world war being 
waged. People, culture, and lifestyles of varying degrees were introduced. Arguably, none were 
more different and bizarre to the American soldiers than the African soldiers who fought under 
the French flag. 
These men were unlike any Brenden Phibbs had seen. One day out looking for 
ambulances, the combat surgeon stumbled upon a tent full of Algerians and their French officer. 
As he lit a cigarette, one Algerian came forward and asked him if he had any cigarettes to sell. 
Phibbs wrote, “Sell them, hell; I was grateful to be alive and among friends: I was ready to give 
them away.” When he suggested this, there came a somber mood within the tent. The French 
officer suggested he and Phibbs take a walk. The Frenchman explained these men were 
mercenaries; to them war was a business. To just give the cigarettes away was an insult. They 
could not accept him as a fellow warrior.84 
Finding another carton, Phipps followed the officer as he explained, “Bargaining is polite 
it’s important. That carton is worth a thousand francs and you’ll have to make them bargain for 
it. Be prepared to be hard hearted; remember, not bargaining is like spitting on your plate at 
dinner.”85 
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Once inside, the negotiations began. The Algerian began at 500 francs. Phibbs played the 
part well. “I clutched the carton to my bosom and looked sad,” he wrote. The African slowly rose 
his price, but Phibbs continued his act.  Phibbs continued, “I dramatized the poverty of my wife 
and two children in America…the disgrace in my family’s eyes if I failed to generate a proper 
return.” Throughout this performance, Phibbs noted, the platoon followed the discussion back 
and forth, as if they were watching a tennis match.86 
They two finally settled on a price of 980 francs. Phibbs pretended to be dejected as he 
handed of carton over to the Algerian who coolly winked at his party. Later, Phibbs and the 
French officer had a discussion about the Algerians. The officer reiterated they were 
mercenaries, and made their living for a price. “They’re brave for me, they’re brave for their 
careers as professional soldiers. They’ll go exactly as far as I lead them; if I don’t lead, they 
don’t follow. I am paid more than they are, therefore I’m supposed to be braver than they are.” 
As they left, Phibbs gave the Frenchman more cigarettes that the he took without hesitation. 87 
 The odd behavior of the Africans probably seemed extremely odd to Phibbs and the other 
soldiers who interacted with the French colonials. To the Africans, the behavior of the 
Americans was probably just as bizarre. 
*  *  * 
      Despite the hardships of the war, soldiers found a few moments of downtime for 
reflection after the capture of Colmar. The opportunity to go to mass was present for William 
Pena, who attended mass every day of his life. Using the basement of the church, Pena regarded 
the sermon as one of devotion and prayer. Pena realized during the service that he was fully 
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armed, but this was not a problem. Two days later, on February 5, he attended a mass led by the 
regimental chaplain, and it was there the priest brought up the execution of Pvt. Eddie Slovik, the 
only American soldier executed during the war for desertion, and a member of the 109th Infantry 
Regiment. The priest said Slovik was the bravest man he ever met when he faced his execution 
when there were soldiers in combat who did not know when their death would be. Pena also 
noted that the priest took offense to the Army’s action for ordering the execution.88   
Other men moved around town to aid the civilians. As Brenden Phibbs made rounds with 
a French nun and an aid man from his unit, he soon made it to a house that had a collapsed roof 
with an elderly woman inside. She became pinned down for two days when shelling caused the 
roof to fall and trap her. Her shattered femur awkwardly bent at a 45-degree angle in the middle 
of her thigh. Phibbs noted it was a miracle her femur had not broken through the skin. Knocking 
her out with chloroform, Phibbs and his assistants managed to set the leg. With a shot of 
morphine, Phibbs said 30 minutes later the woman was chatting up a storm about the 
predicament she had to endure over the past two days. While she spoke, Phibbs, who spoke 
German (people in Alsace are familiar with a dialect of Upper German known as Alsatian), 
thought he heard her say a word in Yiddish. Born in New York, where Yiddish was a familiar 
sound, Phibbs said to her “If I didn’t know I was in Alsace I’d think I was in the Bronx. Only a 
Jewish grandmother could be that funny after everything you’ve been through.” At the mention 
of “Jewish,” Phibbs noted the woman’s face turned to terror as she grabbed his sleeve, and asked 
him how he knew her secret. It took several minutes for her to calm down from the reassurances 
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from Phibbs that the Germans were gone. Even then she still said, “I don’t believe they’re gone; 
I don’t believe they’ll ever go.”89 
All the way into Colmar, the woman kept asking for reassurance that her secret was safe. 
Even though Phibbs assured her, she told him “You still can’t trust them. Tell them I French, 
Alsatian French. Keep our secret.” As they entered the hospital, Phibbs told the hospital staff the 
nature of her wounds. Phibbs wrote in his memoir “The old lady sank her nails into my wrist.” 
He informed the staff that she was Alsatian French. A surprised nurse responded “Well of course 
she’s French. We are all French, thank God.” As they wheeled her around the corner, the woman 
gave Phibbs a wink. A young French doctor asked, “You two got some kind of secret? What’s 
going on?” Phibbs responded, “Yes, you bet we have a secret. A big state secret. I’d be the last to 
tell you.”90 
   *  *  * 
      With Colmar secure, things began to fall apart for the Germans. The same day the 
liberation of Colmar took place, February 2, the Allies began to see a general retreat of the 
Germans in France. Whether it was Hitler’s orders to retreat or the Germans around Colmar, no 
one knows. But whoever gave the order, it was hastily followed.91 But the collapse of the Colmar 
pocket was not quite finished. The Germans on the east side of the river had not completely 
given up. More importantly, the fortress city of Neuf-Brisach was still in German hands. No one 
knew how many more casualties it would take before the city fell.  
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Chapter 3 
Death of the Pocket: The Final Push to Neuf-Brisach, February 1-9, 1945 
There was never just a ‘little’ battle or ‘unimportant’ battle because one bullet is all it 
took to get you killed. You would always be hoping and praying it wouldn’t be you. You 
were completely exhausted most of the time, but you were forced to stay alert in order to 
survive. You walked like you were in a trance, and kept talking to God to help you.  
 
                                                                                                                             Troy Cox1 
 
As the Colmar Pocket collapsed along with the remaining German defenses, American 
soldiers shifted their attention to the final part of their mission: to eliminate the German threat on 
the west side of the Rhine River once and for all. As they moved towards the Rhine, intense and 
near continuous combat pushed many of the men to the breaking point. Some soldiers who 
pressed on exhibited remarkable humanity under the pressure of vicious fighting, while many 
others devolved into a level of barbarism inaugurated by the total war they fought.   
Since Colmar had fallen under Allied control, the Colmar-Rouffach Road became the 
only way for the Germans to escape the Colmar Pocket. As word of the German retreat spread, 
Allies around Colmar pushed fast to link up with the French I Corps. They were south of Colmar 
and moved northeast. The newly arrived 12th Armored Division pushed south from Strasbourg, 
where it suffered horrendous casualties in the battle of Herrlisheim, and attached to the XXI 
Corps. The 12th attacked eastward on February 3, when elements of the 12th’s Combat Command 
B took bridgeheads at Sundhoffen and Ste. Croix-en-Plaine—both located on the Ill River 
parallel to the Rhine. Despite early successes, the 12th Armored managed to make it only 800 
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yards past the bridgeheads before the tired and dogged Germans stopped them. Due to the 
ineffectiveness of the 12th Armored, the 28th Infantry Division had to relieve the 12th on the 
morning of February 5 to keep up the attack.2  
Even though Combat Command B struggled, other parts of the 12th Armored Division 
had better success. One of these groups was Combat Command A, who had only been in Colmar 
for a few hours. At around 1600 on February 4, they moved out to attack the town of Hattstatt. 
Their goal was to push through and make it to the village of Rouffach. As Combat Command A 
approached Hattstatt, the unit received fire. German fire took out three tanks. Despite the 
adversity, Combat Command A seized the town and captured around 50 troops. In the early 
morning of February 5, the 12th Armored began to move to the village of Rouffach, ten miles 
south of Colmar. Along the way, the Allies destroyed several horse-drawn transports. That same 
day, elements of the 43rd Tank Battalion prepared to assault on the town. Uneasy with the 
prospect of renewed street-to-street fighting, the American troops nevertheless got ready for the 
attack.3   
      Once they sealed the exit to Rouffach, the Americans slowly moved into town. Their goal 
was to link with the small force of French Moroccans who moved in from the other side of town. 
Company C of the 66th Armored Infantry Battalion entered town right before dawn but met no 
real resistance. All the obstacles they encountered were for show. The Allies took the town 
without bloodshed and captured the entire enemy force, totaling fifteen German soldiers. The 
French and American commanders met at 0800 at the center of town, ironically the intersection 
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of Adolf Hitler Strasse and Herman Goering Strasse. The Moroccan soldiers who assisted the 
GIs were quite different from what the Americans experienced in combat. According to Clarence 
Blakeslee, the Moroccan troops “had mules and wore uniforms that looked like bathrobes. We 
were told that their wives traveled with them.”4  
      There was no denying the feeling of the French in Rouffach: “The people lined the streets 
and cheered as we came in,” Weston Emory, a member of Company C, 66th Armored Infantry 
Regiment remembered, and “gave us wine and cognac.” A few days later while on patrol, Emery 
and other GIs stopped at a small school-house near Rouffach. “We looked through the school 
books [and] wrote our names in the Attendance Record,” Emery remembered, adding the patrol 
also “had a lesson on Germany, and left our thoughts of Hitler on the blackboard. Don’t 
remember who the teacher was that day.” In the three days since the 12th Armored arrived in the 
Colmar Pocket, they took 548 prisoners, killed nearly 300, and wounded another 850. With the 
capture of Rouffach, American forces had effectively split the Colmar Pocket.  All along the 
break, the Allied forces took large numbers of prisoners. New York Times correspondent Clifton 
Daniel, who later served as editor of the newspaper, estimated the Allies had captured some 
10,000 Germans prisoner since the offensive began on January 20.5  
*  *  * 
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        With Horbourg captured, the main escape route for the Germans disappeared, which 
enabled French armor to move on the town of Andolsheim. By the end of February 1, the 3rd 
Infantry Division occupied a line which extended in between the Ill River to the Rhine-Rhone 
Canal and stretched on a line from Horbourg to the Bois de Biesheim, and ended again along the 
Rhine-Rhone Canal. The further objective for the 3rd Infantry was to continue south and seize the 
fortress city of Neuf-Brisach. If this action succeeded, the two bridges the Germans used for their 
escape would be denied.6 
 Beginning at 0100 on February 1, the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 30th Infantry Regiment 
pushed off and moved through the Bois de Biesheim to eliminate German resistance west of the 
Rhine-Rhone Canal. Shortly after dawn, lead elements of 1st Battalion reached their objective 
and fired on enemy vehicles. By noon on February 1, they had captured over 100 prisoners. The 
3rd Battalion reached their objective in the early morning as well but suffered heavy casualties 
when they made their way through the woods of Biesheim. Many wounds occurred from tree 
bursts. 
Tree bursts provided an extra worry for the Americans. They first experienced this type 
of attack in the Fall of 1944, when American soldiers first entered the Hurtgen Forest in 
Belgium. As the GIs advanced in the woods, the Germans launched artillery with timed fuses, 
with the intent on the shells exploding among the trees above the Americans. The GIs 
instinctively dove to the ground, just like training dictated. By dropping to the ground, however, 
the GIs not only exposed themselves to shell fragments but large splinters which traveled as fast 
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as a bullet that could become lodged in the skin and muscle. They learned to adapt quickly by 
hugging the nearest tree.7  
By 1600(4 p.m.) hours, 3rd Battalion of the 30th Infantry Regiment captured a battery of 
150mm artillery guns that the Germans did not have time to destroy before they fled. At the same 
time, 1st Battalion employed mortar fire to sink German barges tied up in the canal. Late the next 
night, February 2, a patrol from Company E reached the northern ramparts of Neuf-Brisach to 
gather reconnaissance on the height of the defenses. When the men returned, they reported the 
walls were 17-18 feet high.8 
 The 7th Infantry Regiment also had to cross the Rhine-Rhone Canal to meet their 
objective. The Germans fired on them as they approached. Since the Americans expected heavy 
fire, tanks accompanied them. When the German artillery opened on the Americans, the tanks 
backed up. Bert Craft remembered, “There was a young man who was so tired he couldn’t 
function properly, and he didn’t get out of the way of the tank and it backed over him. I will 
never forget the death scream he gave as he was crushed beneath the tank. It was nerve racking 
to know that a life had been taken so needlessly by one of our own.”9 
      The 7th Infantry advanced into Artzenheim and Kunheim and opened their attack at dawn 
on February 2 following an artillery barrage. Despite the massive amount of fire, all the rounds 
landed behind the town. As they moved in, they met sporadic resistance, since many Germans 
                                                             
7 Edward G. Miller, A Dark and Bloody Ground: The Hurtgen Forest and the Roer River Dams, 1944-1945(College 
Station: Texas A&M University Press,1995),33. See also Stephen E. Ambrose, Citizen Soldiers, The U.S. Army from 
the Normandy Beaches to the Bulge to the Surrender of Germany June 7, 1944-May 7, 1945(New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1997),167. 
8 Rupert Phrome, History of the 30th Infantry Regiment in World War II (Washington: Infantry Journal  
Press,1947), 319- 320. 
9 W. Bert Craft. Agony of Hell (Paducah: Turner Publishing Company,1994), 84. 
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had already made a hasty retreat out of the town. With Artzenheim in Allied hands, the regiment 
moved to the second objective, the town of Kunheim. As before, artillery preceded the assault. 
Unlike the previous barrage, however, the fire on Kunheim was extremely accurate. Much of the 
town was now on fire. The men dealt with a new enemy as they moved forward. As January 
turned into February, snow around Colmar started to melt, turning the region into a mud pit. As 
one company of the 7th moved in from the north, another company proceeded to flank the town 
and move in from the south. All of those on hand anticipated fire from the Germans. But 
Kunheim fell without a shot. American troops took several German soldiers and civilians from 
cellars in the town. Excited civilians presented their liberators with souvenir Nazi banners as 
well as eggs, chickens, and jam to the famished soldiers. As the men sat around and waited to 
move out again, discussions about their mission broke out. “Taking these smelly little villages 
was getting monotonous,” one soldier stated. The next day, the 7th heard Colmar had fallen. 
Despite the good news, German traffic crossing the bridge at Neuf-Brisach was still very much a 
problem. Some GIs believed the Germans would try to make a stand before the Allies reached 
the town. With Kunheim secure, the men took a short rest. Many of them slept in beds with real 
sheets. In the meantime, engineers built a bailey bridge over a canal south of the town.10 
      The next task for the 7th Infantry Regiment was to take control of the village of Biesheim. 
Biesheim looked like many of the villages around Alsace. Before the war, it was the most 
prosperous town around Neuf-Brisach. When the Germans marched into France in 1940, most of 
                                                             
10Mooney, Seventh United States Infantry Regiment, 81-82; John C. McManus, American Courage, American 
Carnage: The 7th Infantry Regiment’s Combat Experience, 1812 through World War II (New York: Tom Doherty 
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Biesheim’s inhabitants fled, only to return once the German conquest was complete—minus the 
Jewish inhabitants.11   
This was where the German chose to make their stand before Neuf-Brisach. Defenses for 
the town were like those the 254th Infantry Regiment encountered around Jebsheim a few days 
earlier. If Biesheim fell, the Germans in what was left of the Colmar Pocket would be finished 
and they knew it, because communication and supply lines would be severed. The Germans had 
stored large quantities of ammunition and food in the town. Aerial reconnaissance showed 
trenches dug north of Biesheim as well as machine gun nests and reinforced bunkers. Dense 
grape vines north of also made their advance difficult across flat, open terrain. The attack, 
therefore, would be made in the middle of the night. Again, as with the other towns, artillery 
preceded the assault. As the artillery let loose, the men of the 7th Infantry Regiment waited in 
shin-deep mud for the order to move forward.12 
 Companies I and K made the initial advance. Some rode tanks, whiles others trudged 
through the mud, careful to stay out from behind the tanks in case they had to back up quickly, for 
fear of getting crushed under the treads. As they moved, the GIs passed what they thought were 
several deserted foxholes. As they passed the trenches, however, German fire from behind opened 
from the foxholes they had just bypassed. Dark conditions, in tandem with excellent concealment, 
had allowed the hiding Germans to go unnoticed. Their fire killed several Americans and wounded 
many others, who fell in the mud as tracers illuminated the darkness. Capt. Francis Kret, 
Commander of Company K, ordered the men to move in on the trenches ahead of them. They 
                                                             
11 Stephen J Ochs, A Cause Greater Than Self: The Journey of Captain Michael J. Daly,  
World War II Medal of Honor Recipient. (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 2012)112. 
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successfully reached the trenches only to find them filled with Germans equipped with small arms, 
machine guns, as well as the Panzerfaust, the German antitank weapon similar to the bazooka. The 
trenches also had angles which prevented them from shooting directly down the length of the 
trench. The American troops fought desperately in close-quarter combat and eliminated the 
resistance in a portion of the trenches. They then “tossed the lifeless bodies of the Germans from 
the trench in order to make more room,” one soldier recalled, who added, “a scream would pierce 
the night when a soldier was hit.”13 
 As they moved west, Company K continued to clear out German soldiers. They acted under 
to guise “Take no prisoners,” and shot anyone who surrendered, mainly because they did not have 
the manpower to deal with captives. The men who took part in this action were not the least bit 
bashful when they discussed the circumstances of what they had done.14  
                                                             
13 Quoted in Mooney, Seventh United States Infantry Regiment, 85. See also McManus, American Courage, 
American Carnage, 496. 
14 Mooney, Seventh United States Infantry Regiment, 85. 
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      Figure 8. Forrest Peden  
 
After several hours of especially brutal fighting, the GIs in the trenches started to run out 
of supplies. Medics had to treat a growing number of wounded in the mud. While these men battled 
the Germans in close quarters, the extraordinary heroism of one soldier emerged as they fought in 
the trenches. Forrest Peden (Fig. 8) was not a member of the 7th Infantry Regiment but was instead 
a part of Battery C, 10th Field Artillery Battalion. As an observer, he accompanied the infantry to 
call down artillery. With his radio disabled, Peden sprang into action and rendered aid to two 
wounded infantrymen while under heavy fire. He realized the situation the men in the trenches 
faced if support was not brought in. He ran 800 yards through mud and heavy fire (a bullet pierced 
his jacket) and reached Battalion Command where he acquired two light tanks to aid the GIs. 
Knowing what was at stake, Peden climbed up on one of the tanks to direct them since there was 
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little moonlight. As they reached the ditch, the tanks prepared to engage the Germans, but the 
enemy was quicker. They struck the tank carrying Peden, and he died in a ball of flame. But the 
light the tank produced allowed other members of the battalion to come to the aid of Company K. 
For his sacrifice, Peden was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.15   
      As Company K held out, members of Company I progressed towards Biesheim in another 
section of the trenches. Unlike Company K, Company I advanced with tank support. This allowed 
them to viciously attack the enemy positions and cut down those Germans who tried to make a 
break for it. Others became caught in the mud and crushed under the treads of the American tanks. 
Company I skirted around Biesheim, and at 0400, they began to clear houses one by one. Once 
they broke into a house, the men of Company I had to face fire from all manner of weapons by 
Germans determined to hold the town. To add to this mess, they also took fire from German 
snipers.16 
 As Company I searched the town, a small portion of Company K managed to regroup with 
what little manpower they had and moved around the west side of Biesheim. As they entered the 
town, they threw grenades into houses on the outskirts of the village. This caused the Germans 
inside to retreat. Down to only 13 men, the GIs set up defensive positions, but they had the 
unknown on their side. The Germans, not knowing how many Americans there were, did not 
attack. Had they known, one staff member remembered, “they certainly would have charged the 
buildings.”17 
                                                             
15 Alan Bourdius, “Technician Fifth Grade Forrest E. Pedan, USA (February 3, 1945)”, Finest Hour, last updated 
February 6, 2015, accessed August 29, 2017, http://theirfinesthour.net/2015/02/peden/; Mooney, Seventh United 
States Infantry Regiment 85; Donald Taggert, ed., History of the 3rd Infantry Division in World War II (Washington: 
Infantry Journal Press, 1947), 319; Medal of Honor Citation for Forrest Pedan, February 13, 1946. 
16 Mooney, Seventh United States Infantry Regiment, 87-88. 
17 Ibid., 93. 
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 At the same time Companies I and K moved toward Biesheim, other elements of the 7th 
Infantry Regiment prepared to attack. Companies C, E, and F moved across footbridges at 
Kunheim to attack Biesheim from the west. They encountered fire from the Germans directly south 
of Kunheim. As they arrived at the trench system around Biesheim, American Armor opened on 
the Germans. The fire from the tanks was so devastating the infantry did not have to stop and 
bypassed the trenches without so much as a look inside. Due to the artillery that set Biesheim on 
fire, the visibility was excellent. The three companies entered the town, cleared out a few houses, 
and set up defensive positions, and along with the rest of Company K, waited for the inevitable 
counterattack.18 
 The anticipated counterattack began around dawn on February 3 when about 50 German 
infantrymen advanced towards Company F’s defensive position, unaware of the trap set for them 
in the form of two American machine guns. The two guns fired and caught the Germans by 
surprise. Of those that were not killed, the rest either took off or raised their hands in surrender.19  
*  *  * 
Most of Company K was still inside the trench system north of town, where the wounded 
still piled up. Capt. Kret was down to 14 unwounded men, low on ammunition, and in desperate 
need of food and water. He called back on the radio in desperation, simply saying, “I’d sure like 
to see you guys again.” Despite their precarious situation, what remained of Company K refused 
to give in. Germans on the road across from them opened fire, and Kret was heard to say “Ouch!” 
                                                             
18 Mooney, Seventh United States Infantry Regiment, 93-94. 
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as he fell to the ground, wounded. Despite the wounds, he maintained the order of his men, and 
the line held.20 
 Right before dark, Maj. Duncan, the 2nd Battalion Commander, ordered elements of 
Company E, along with one tank, to the east of Biesheim, to aid Companies K and L. The three 
companies laid down concentrated fire into the northern section of Biesheim from three sides. 
Following the intense firefight, around 50 Germans surrendered. American troops put the prisoners 
in the cellar of a nearby house. Most prisoners had their hands in the air, but a member of Company 
I noticed one POW walk up to the entrance with his hands in his pockets. With a grin on his face 
he “looked like he owned the place.” In response, another American exclaimed “Handy-Ho, you 
son-of-a-bitch!” The German began to take out his hands, but not with the speed the Americans 
liked. The GI proceeded to kick the German in the face, “Wiping the smile off the bastard’s face.” 
The force of the kick sent the German rolling down the stairs, to which he promptly got up and 
continued hands high in the air.21 
 The men fighting in Biesheim were not the only ones who faced a stressful situation in the 
attack. Russell Cloer, the commander of Headquarters Company, 7th Infantry Regiment, was back 
at Company Headquarters in Kunheim, about a mile away. Ten days earlier, Cloer went into 
combat with six officers of the company. Ten days later, three of the officers were dead and two 
others received wounds serious enough to need evacuation. By default, Cloer was now 
Headquarters Company Commander. Inside the Company CP, there were blackout conditions. 
Army blankets covered the windows. Cloer was writing a letter by candlelight. There was no 
electricity to light the glass fixtures above him. As he wrote, the owner of the house came up from 
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the cellar and talked to Cloer’s sergeant. Distracted, Cloer got up to see what the discussion was 
about. Cloer recalled “As I got out of my chair, a shell burst in a tree outside the house. I saw glass 
fragments falling down on the table. A shell fragment had come through the shutter, smashed the 
glass lighting fixture, went through the leather back of the chair I had been sitting in and lodged in 
the wall behind the chair. If I hadn’t moved, I would have been dead, no question about it.”22 
Even though Biesheim was now clear, Company K still took fire in the trenches north of 
town. Company L went to assist. They fired as fast as they could to trick the enemy into believing 
it was a larger force than it really was. They screamed “Handy Ho!” as loud as they could as they 
moved forward in the mud. When they heard Company L approach, the men of Company K fired 
voraciously and used up the last of their ammunition. 45 Germans realized the situation they were 
in and wisely surrendered. As Company L cleaned out the rest of the trenches, they took more 
prisoners, with a few wounded Germans. “We shot the wounded Germans,” the men of Company 
L explained, “because we only had twenty men and couldn’t fool with them.”23 
As the battle for Biesheim ended, the men who took part reflected upon their sacrifice. 
Casualties were 26 killed, 77 wounded, and 350 prisoners. They built fires inside the cellars to dry 
their clothes. One soldier summed up the struggle for Biesheim, which could probably be agreed 
upon by all the 7th men who took part, by simply stating, “That was a son-of- a-bitch!”24 
                                                     *  *  * 
 At dawn on the morning of February 3, as the men of 2nd and 3rd Battalion struggled at 
Biesheim, the GIs of the 1st Battalion assaulted a German position that was harassing the town. 
                                                             
22 Sandra Stewart Holyoak, An Interview with Russell W. Cloer for the Rutgers Oral History Program, September 
11, 2001. 
23 Mooney, Seventh United States Infantry Regiment, 99-100. 
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This target was ironic as the Allies fought their way into Germany in the Spring of 1945. Their 
objective would be the Cemetery je Juif, a Jewish Cemetery on the outskirts of Biesheim. Just 
getting to the cemetery was stressful for 1st Battalion.25 As the battalion approached the 
cemetery, they came under fire by the Germans. Bert Craft yelled at three of his men to separate. 
One of the men responded, “Aw, the hells with the Germans,” Craft recalled. “And no sooner 
than he had gotten this out of his mouth, a mortar shell fell in between them and got all three. I 
don’t know how many machine guns, but they were raking the open field and our guys were 
dropping like flies.”26 
Because of the fire, members of Company C withdrew 400 yards back, where they stayed 
for the rest of the morning. Company A was also fired upon and took defensive position along a 
dike around the cemetery. These men saw other troops west of their position and did not know if 
they were American or Germans out in the field since they did not have any field glasses. After 
some thought, they decided they were the enemy and fired on them. The opposing side returned 
fire. “That sounds like an M-1,” one man said, to which the platoon leader, Lt. Albert Kelly 
responded, “Hell no! that’s Kraut!” Company A immediately called for artillery. Falling short, the 
GIs called for a correction, but the fire ceased. The reason was because the soldiers Company A 
fired upon and called artillery fire down on was American. It was a group of reinforcements sent 
to bolster Company K in the trenches. Once it became clear, by way of the artillery, that they 
prepared to engage friendly troops, combat ceased. Company A attempted to make their way into 
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the cemetery. This time, however, they met the real enemy. This halted their advance. Company 
B also had difficulty on the way to the cemetery.27 
 At around 1430(2:30 p.m.) hours, Allied artillery pummeled the cemetery. As the fire let 
up, Company B with tank support attacked the German position in the cemetery. They came under 
fire as they approached, which caused them to move back from the cemetery to their former 
positions for the rest of the day. Shortly after midnight on February 4, Company C tried their luck 
against the Germans. They climbed aboard tanks and proceeded slowly forward. As they moved 
forward, German machine guns opened on the tanks. “Would you believe those silly Germans 
opened up on us with machine gun fire,” Bert Craft remembered. The tanks returned fire, and the 
sound they caused was deafening. “My ears were ringing, and I almost fell off the tank,” Craft 
wrote. He dismounted and yelled at his men to move forward and get the Germans. As he reached 
one of the machine guns, the German had their hands in the air, ready to surrender. Craft’s blood 
was up as he reached the guns. He went directly for the gunner. He reached over the machine gun, 
grabbed the gunner by the hair with his left hand, jerked him out of the foxhole over the machine 
gun, and took him prisoner. By dawn, they had cleared a large section of the cemetery. The rest of 
the battalion followed suit, and they all set up defensive positions.28  
At dawn, a few hours later, members of the 15th Infantry Regiment relieved the men around 
the cemetery. Company C moved back into the town where they started from when they pushed to 
the cemetery. But when they got back, everyone’s adrenaline was up. Sleep was out of the question. 
Bert Craft took a walk on his own. As he walked, a Captain drove up with a prisoner in his jeep. 
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The Captain said, “Say, soldier, were you in the fight for the cemetery?” When Craft said he was, 
the officer asked if he wanted to have the commanding German officer who had put up the 
resistance. When Craft showed interest at the prospect, the Captain answered, “I got him in the 
back seat. The son of a bitch won’t talk.” Sensing fear in the Germans eyes, Craft said, “Well, 
captain, please turn him over to me, and I’ll shoot the son of a bitch.” The captain laughed and 
said he was taking him to the rear, where they would get the information out. Craft said good luck 
and if he needed help that he was in Company C and would love to take care of the man. This 
battle was one of the strangest battles Craft had participated in during the war, and one of the most 
brutal in terms of casualties, something he found ironic since it took place in a cemetery.29 
 The men of the 15th Infantry Regiment who relieved the 7th included Audie Murphy. As he 
crawled over a stone wall alone to reconnoiter, Murphy realized he had entered the cemetery. He 
remembered, “Some of the graves are covered with mica; and the glitter with the light of the 
striking moon. We are in luck. The wall extends entirely around the place; and in case of attack, 
the tombstones and grave mounds will be handy as cover.” He signaled the rest of his men to enter, 
and they promptly dug in and set the watch. Murphy himself took the guard on the gate. Not 
wanting to sit down because he was afraid he would fall asleep, Murphy leaned against a 
tombstone. “Once I risked closing my eyes and immediately drop off to sleep,” Murphy said. “I 
awake with a jerk. I cannot take that chance again.” Taking out his pistol from the holster, he held 
in at waist-length with both hands. That way, “The next time I doze the gun slips from my fingers, 
strikes my feet, and brings me back to consciousness.”30  
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 Once the sun rose, Murphy saw what he and men were up against. As Murphy looked 
through a hole in the wall, he saw a group of Germans out in an open field, directly outside the 
cemetery perimeter. He noticed a German sergeant wake and ordered the other men under his 
command to get up. One of Murphy’s men took notice, and as he measured the distance for fire, 
he said, “Dying at reveille is going to be easy, they can just turn over and go back to sleep forever.” 
As the Germans rose out of bed, Murphy and his men counted about twenty of the enemy. The GIs 
fired, and several Germans dropped. As the Germans tried to get a sense of what direction the fire 
came from, two more Germans fell.  The others wisely surrendered. “Okay men,” Murphy barked, 
“go out and get them.”31 With that, Murphy and his men eliminated resistance around the cemetery. 
*  *  * 
Following the brutal and costly fighting through the Colmar Pocket, there lay only one 
more obstacle left for the Allies in France: the fortress town of Neuf-Brisach.  Founded in 1669 
at the request of Louis XIV and built by the master fortress builder the Marquis de Vauban, 
many consider the fortress his finest work. Even though there was a town located within the 
walls, Vauban constructed it from a military standpoint.  This included not only circular ramparts 
around the entire length, but inside of the fort as well. From the air, it looks almost impregnable. 
Also from the air, another aspect of the town becomes noticeable. The outline and layout give 
Neuf-Brisach the resemblance to a waffle iron (Fig. 9). The Americans nicknamed the town 
“waffle city.” According to the official G-2 History of the 6th Army Group, “It’s very shape 
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suggested an unbroken outer perimeter bristling with hostile rifles, machine pistols, and machine 
guns.”32  
From a military standpoint, it would have been insane not to fortify Neuf-Brisach to the 
hilt to make it the Germans’ last stand in France. In 1870, during the Franco-Prussian war, 
French soldiers held out inside Neuf-Brisach for an entire month. Since the German goal was to 
disrupt and harass Allied troops on the west side of the Rhine as long as possible, they had the 
perfect defensive position to do just that. Intelligence reports estimated there were possibly as 
many as one thousand Germans inside the city.  Aerial reconnaissance believed the capture of 
Neuf-Brisach would be difficult but was ultimately inevitable. As the Allies prepared to assault 
the town, French First Army Commander Jean de Lattre de Tassigny mocked, “Enclosed within 
its ramparts, in the century-old moats and raised drawbridges, the strange military city remained 
enigmatical. We made ready for medieval assault, with ladders and battering rams-and, if 
necessary, the addition of artificial moonlight!”33  Despite the joke, it was not a stretch to say the 
men whose task it was to take the town probably felt a little apprehensive. 
                                                             
32 Mooney, Seventh United States Infantry Regiment,105; Final Report, G-2 Section, Headquarters, 6th Army Group 
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Figure 9. Ariel view of Neuf-Brisach, showing the distinctive “waffle iron” layout. 
    The plan of attack for the 3rd Infantry Division in the early morning of February 5 called 
for the 7th Infantry Regiment to attack straight south from Biesheim. They were between the 15th 
Infantry Regiment on the left alongside the Rhine River and the 30th Infantry Regiment on the 
right moving south along the Rhine-Rhone Canal. The 7th had been ordered to avoid the roads 
because they thought they were heavily defended. They therefore moved across the open fields. 
Jump-off time for the attack was shortly after midnight. As the 7th proceeded, they encountered 
trenches like those around Biesheim. Company I bypassed them and continued to move. 
Suddenly, fire opened from the trenches from the behind them. They fell into the same trap 
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Company K had a few days earlier at Biesheim. They were fortunate, however, thanks to 
accompanying tanks that quickly fired into the trenches. Other 7th men entered the trenches and 
eliminated any threats that remained. This caused somewhat of a problem when the American 
and German fire became mixed. After they reorganized, they continued south towards their first 
two objectives, a tobacco plant and a railroad station. There they captured 15 Germans along 
with a food cart. Their last meal had been awhile, so the cart was promptly brought into the 
factory, where they distributed the hot coffee and bologna to the famished soldiers. Other 
Germans, who were not seen in the original advance, moved towards the factory, unaware of the 
GIs presence. Once the Germans realized their situation, they promptly surrendered. Further 
searches of the factory uncovered large quantities of supplies and ammunition. Americans also 
discovered a supply of cognac, which they hastily seized and distributed.34  
As they pushed further south, some GIs in the 7th found a warehouse and captured 28 
Germans who surrendered without firing a shot. Clearing out other buildings in the area and 
meeting only slight resistance, the GIs, which comprised the 35 men left of Company L, made 
defensive positions. They soon became aware of Germans dug in all around them. They had to 
deal with any Germans who moved on their positions. Searchlights provided enough light for the 
men to distinguish when someone moved towards them, and the GIs challenged them. If they 
responded in German, the Americans fired. Soon after dawn, Company L observed two groups 
of enemies moving towards Neuf-Brisach, totaling about 60 men, all of them armed. They held 
their fire and waited until the Germans were about 400 yards away. The order ‘Give ‘em hell!’ 
was shouted; the GIs all opened up at the same time, and the Germans scattered. One German 
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realized the hopelessness of the situation and rose from the mud, his hands in the air. Others 
followed suit, holding white handkerchiefs.35  
 While 3rd Battalion seized the approaches to Neuf-Brisach, 1st Battalion moved to the 
village of Vogelsheim, located directly west of Neuf-Brisach. Approaching the town in the mud, 
the GIs were on mounted armor support. As they approached the town, the GIs received artillery 
fire. This was not German fire, however, but from American artillery. The friendly fire caused 
several wounds. The advance continued, however. As they entered Vogelsheim, the 1st Battalion 
men cleared the houses of Germans, and set up defensive positions. Bert Craft had a difficult 
time getting his men to make defensive positions. He remembered, “Being raw recruits, my 
scouts we afraid. I couldn’t get anything out of them. I kept yelling and yelling at them to go, to 
knock out windows and locked doors.” After breaking windows and tossing grenades inside, 
Craft and his men succeeded to clear out the houses along the street.36 
 Close to 0100, as 1st and 3rd Battalion moved to their objectives, 2nd Battalion jumped off 
and moved towards Caserne Abbatucci, a military barrack built before World War I. Companies 
E and G rode upon the armor, while Company F followed along on foot. After about 200 yards, 
Germans opened on the GIs. The Germans were in trenches south of Biesheim. This position was 
in the Jewish Cemetery, still in German hands at the time. The forward companies, along with 
the armor, pushed forwards towards Caserne Abbatucci. Back in Biesheim, Company F prepared 
to move. Right before they pushed off, one of the tanks in support was hit and set on fire. The 
fire caused enough light for the Germans to bring down artillery. The German fire confused the 
GIs, and it took three hours for them to regroup and make their attack. They moved on the 
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trenches which had fired on the other elements of the 2nd Battalion. By 0700, Company F had 
made contact with the rest of 2nd Battalion.37 
 The next morning, Germans counterattacked Bert Craft’s company. “We were looking 
out across a field and there was a company of Germans running towards the town, shooting and, 
boy, did they look awesome,” Craft wrote. “I’m telling you they looked like supermen.” Craft 
and his men fired with everything they had. He estimated he shot up half of his ammunition. 
While he fired, he happened to look over at one of his men, and to his surprise, he had his head 
down and was crying. Craft asked the man “What in the hell is wrong with you? Why aren’t you 
shooting those damn Krauts?” The soldier in question was of German descent and said, “Oh, I 
can’t shoot my flesh and blood.” Craft threw his empty gun at the man and said, “Load it, and 
give me yours.” Craft kept his fire up as the man loaded for him.38  
 The conflict the young soldier faced was a common theme throughout the ETO, even 
though most chose to do their duty. Why was there conflict? It was simple numbers: Of the 
millions of Americans fighting across Europe, one-fourth of them could trace their family back 
to Germany.39 When the young man said he could not shoot his flesh and blood, he could have 
very well been correct thinking his enemy could literally be members of his own family. In the 
end, however what he felt was irrelevant. Whether he fired his weapon or not, the Germans 
would die in large numbers throughout the war. 
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After the attack, French Moroccans brought a group of German prisoners to Biesheim. A 
German prisoner came up to Craft and asked for a cigarette. As they talked, Craft asked the man 
how things were in Germany. To his surprise, the German said morale was very high, and once 
the Allies were across the Rhine River, the Germans would counterattack and drive the Allies 
back into the English Channel. All Craft could do was to laugh and tell the whipped German they 
lost for a second time.40  
While the GIs of the 7th Infantry Regiment advanced south, the 15th Infantry Regiment 
had also moved in the same direction south of Biesheim. After about 800 yards, elements of 1st 
Battalion observed a two-story structure surrounded by barbed wire, with at least 25 German 
entrenched. The Germans promptly opened fire. Michael Daly, a platoon commander in 
Company A, had to react quickly, or lose the few men he had left. As he ordered his men to fall 
back into a ditch, Daly stood up and drew the enemy fire, allowing his men to retreat. For the 
next half-hour, Daly moved back and forth in the open to draw fire. Thanks to Daly, his men 
could move and make their way to the company area. Daly followed his men and encouraged 
those men wounded to keep moving.41  
 As they reached the company area, Daly gave his report on the German strongpoint. The 
60 remaining men in the company had orders to attack the position. They had to cross 500 yards 
through a field that had thawed and turned to mud. Troy Cox, who served with Daly, said, “We 
couldn’t run in at all in the mud, and would fall because it was so soft.” During the dash, Cox, 
who was a machine gunner, tripped and fell. His machine gun, which had numerous holes for 
cooling, became packed with mud. Due to the hazardous terrain, only 19 men made it to the wall 
                                                             
40 Craft, The Agony of Hell, 93. 
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of the house. As armor support cleared a hole, the GIs made their way through and seized the 
house and the defensive positions around it. After the attack, Cox made his way around to the 
back of the house where he found a young German, bleeding badly. Not wanting the boy to just 
die, the GIs searched and found a German medic among the prisoners. As he looked over the 
boy, the medic stood up and said, “Kaput, Kaput.” There was nothing he could do for the boy. 
Some of the Americans moved the injured boy to the porch, where he died. Cox was not at a loss 
for words when he described this boy’s death. “You shoot the enemy,” he noted, “yet sometimes, 
it hurts even to see your enemy die. I believe that was the first time that I had ever felt sorry for a 
German. I looked at the young man and thought, such a young waste of life.”42 Daly felt the 
same sadness about the boy but blamed his death to the Adolf Hitler’s intent to rule the world.43  
 The somber mood was not felt for long. The Germans fired self-propelled artillery at the 
Americans to prevent the GIs from using the crossroads. Company A moved up to take more 
houses around the crossroads. The enemy fired on them as well. The Company A clerk later 
noted 25 men killed or missing that day. By that evening, however, the German fire had stopped, 
as the 15th Infantry captured all their objectives.44 
*  *  * 
 The push of the 7th Infantry Regiment forced the Germans to destroy their bridges in the 
Colmar Pocket. The Germans, with nowhere else to go, moved south. Around 0800 on the 
morning of February 5, they began to leave Neuf-Brisach in large numbers. 7th Infantry soldiers 
had “a field day” as they fired on the masses as they retreated. Artillery and mortars also 
                                                             
42 Troy Cox, An Infantryman’s Memories of World War II:15th Infantry-Third Division (Booneville: Brown-Line 
Printing, 2003), 104-105. See also Ochs, A Cause Greater Than Self, 114, 116-117. 
43 Ochs, A Cause Greater Than Self, 114, 116-117. 
44 Ibid., 117. 
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responded. Bodies were literally torn apart, and along with abandoned equipment, were strewn 
all over the area. Screaming voices could also be heard in the German positions. Those not 
wounded fled in chaos. The German retreat was further compounded by the fact that they 
retreated directly toward French forces moving north. The next morning, February 6, U.S. 
infantry was ready to make an all-out assault on Neuf-Brisach. According to the official G-2 
history of the 6th Army Group: 
When fighting soldiers of the 3rd U.S. Infantry Divisions 7th and 30th Infantry 
Regiments began filing across secretly constructed footbridges over the Fecht River 
below Guemar on the evening of 22 January, most knew their final objective. To 
others would befall a triumphant entry into the city of Colmar. Men of the Third 
Infantry Division visualized another task-that of taking the fortified town of Neuf-
Brisach.45 
The task of taking the city fell to the hardened veterans of the 30th Infantry Regiment. 
Col. Lionel McGarr, the regimental commander, told the 1st Battalion commander, Lt. Colonel 
Porter, that he wanted the waffle for breakfast. The soldiers had to deliver. On the night of 
February 5-6, a small patrol maneuvered to the northeast side of the city, with the mission to see 
if a railroad bridge into town was still standing. As they arrived at the bridge, the GIs found it 
rigged to blow, but otherwise intact. 1st Battalion, under the impression they would have to climb 
the walls of Neuf-Brisach, began to gather ladders and rope. On the morning of February 6, as 
the rest of the battalion prepared for the attack, a small three-man patrol reached the north wall 
and contacted a German machine gun. Around 1000 hours, the patrol noticed a white flag flying 
above the entrance to town. At the same time, another platoon moved along the south wall. As 
they neared the railroad bridge they observed a civilian and after they talked he reluctantly took 
them to a dry moat which contained a 60-foot tunnel that led directly into the city. Another group 
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encountered two young children who also led them into town. The Germans in town were more 
than ready to surrender. In one building alone, 38 Germans surrendered, while others surrendered 
in small groups. Out of an estimated 1,000 men Allies believed were in the city, 76 were in the 
town. Regarding the town’s lack of defense, de Tassigny noted, “Vauban would have probably 
been somewhat embittered at knowing that men could fight for a day in open country in 
contempt of a strong fortress he had carefully constructed.” In an extreme moment of irony, 
several of the German prisoners said the night before, February 5, the officers instructed this 
small group to fight to the last man. The officers then promptly took off.46 
 From here the noose around the Germans tightened. By February 9, they had possession 
of only four villages in France. That morning, the bridge across the Rhine River at the town of 
Chalampe blew up seconds before French troops arrived to seize the bridge.”47  The Colmar 
Offensive was over.  
Even before the fighting ended, De Tassigny felt he needed to address the men with 
Order of the Day No.6: 
Officers, N.C.O.’s, corporals and soldiers, American and French, of the French 
First Army. I cannot await the end of this bitter and victorious battle to tell you of 
my joy and gratitude. For almost three weeks I have given you no respite, and night 
and day I have cried to you, harshly and ceaselessly: Forward! It was Necessary! 
Thank you my dear American comrades, who have brought us your courage and 
have spared nothing, neither your arms nor your blood to help us. As to you, my 
dear French comrades, you can claim with rightful pride that you have been the 
artisans of a great national event of which our children will speak with emotion and 
respect. The Germans have been driven from the sacred soil of France. He shall not 
return!48  
  
                                                             
46 Final Report, G-2 Section, Headquarters, 6th Army Group, 54-55; Phrome, History of the 30th Infantry Regiment 
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      In terms of casualties, both sides suffered. Estimates for the Americans are about 8,000 
total with approximately 500 killed. The French suffered about double those numbers. German 
losses were much higher: 22,000 total casualties. German high officials estimated about 10,000 
men got across the Rhine, but probably no more than 400 or 500 were actually combat soldiers. 
The 198th Division only evacuated around 500 men, with the 338th only 400. The 719th Division 
escaped mostly intact, only because they crossed the Rhine on February 3. The Germans 
abandoned 55 armored vehicles as well as 66 pieces of artillery. Regarding the level of fighting, 
both the French and the Americans had to deal with many obstacles to clear out the Colmar 
Pocket. For example, the official history of the 30th Infantry Regiment states, “During the 
sixteen-day period, the 3rd Infantry Division, reinforced, had captured 22 towns, more than 4,000 
prisoners, and killed an enemy total disproportionately high to the total captured. It virtually 
destroyed the 708th VG (Volksgrenadier) and 2nd Mountain Divisions, badly mauled the 189th 
and 16th VG and destroyed great quantities of all types of German materials.”49 The figures for 
the 3rd Infantry Division are probably representative of what took place in the entire Colmar 
Pocket. 
With the complete fall of the Colmar Pocket, the last German forces abandoned Alsace, 
and completely liberated France from significant Nazi scourge. Even though France was free, 
and the end of the Second World War in Europe was in sight, the Germans were still unwilling to 
completely give up. The war went on, and men needlessly continued to die. In what was known 
as the Colmar Pocket, the celebration continued, if only for a short while. 
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Conclusion 
These frozen rainbows[memories] never lose their brilliance, no matter  
how far in the past they existed. They never fade, but force their way  
into my consciousness even at times they are not wanted. 
 
                                                                                         M. Bedford Davis1 
      
On February 8, 1945, French authorities celebrated the liberation of Colmar. Even though 
U.S. units took part in the celebration, there began to arise a misconception about who actually 
took the town of Colmar, as well as who liberated the Colmar Pocket. This misconception began 
when the 109th Infantry Regiment, 28th Infantry Division, arrived at the outskirts of Colmar. Even 
though the regiment was in a position to take the town, Col. James Rudder, commander of the 
109th, made the diplomatic choice and allowed the French to enter the town. Lise Pommois, 
historian and resident of Alsace, believes the Americans made an error doing this. “It left the 
people with a false idea that the French had liberated themselves,” she says. “Even young French 
soldiers entering the town thought they, not Americans, had liberated the city. The Americans and 
French should have entered the town together.” Ten years later, when the residents of Colmar 
celebrated the 10-year anniversary of the liberation, they correctly invited an American delegation, 
appointed by Eisenhower, now President of the United States. Col. Rudder headed up this group. 
As time passed, however, and the children who watched the celebration in the winter of 1944-45 
were now overseeing the running of Colmar, and the idea of Americans fighting in and around 
Colmar became a lost notion.2 
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      As the years passed, the American effort around Colmar was further diminished. Russell 
Cloer, who fought with the 7th Infantry Regiment, came back to the area years later. “I saw 
several War Memorials to the gallantry of the French soldiers liberating Alsace,” he 
remembered, “but never a mention of the Americans.”3  
      For other GIs, the Colmar Pocket was just a small chapter in their lives. William Pena 
received wounds on the east side of the Rhine, and upon returning home, he became successful 
working for an architectural firm, traveling to different cities, inquiring about building needs. 
Troy Cox returned to Mississippi, taking over his father’s land and became a farmer. 4 
But there were also hidden psychological scars that left a lasting impact. Michael Daly, 
who later won the Medal of Honor as the 3rd Infantry Division pushed into Germany, returned 
home safely, but with a negative view of what happened to him. This affected his opinion of the 
Germans many years after the war. For the longest time, Daly refused to buy German goods, 
even going to the point of not riding in his stepson’s BMW. John D. Erhardt, who was unlucky 
enough to find himself in the snow-covered minefield with the 254th Infantry Regiment as they 
took Hill 216, also brought back painful memories. “For many years,” he wrote, “I found myself 
unconsciously stepping into already established footsteps when traversing snow covered 
ground.”5  
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For all his medals and awards, even Audie Murphy was not immune to the horrors he 
experienced. Years later, Murphy suffered from nightmares and slept with a gun under his 
pillow, and the lights on. His main problem was the life he returned to was not as exciting as the 
one over in Europe. “Seems as though nothing can get me excited anymore-you know, 
enthused?” he once told director John Ford. “Before the war, I’d get excited and enthused about 
a lot of things, but not anymore.” He became addicted to sleeping pills, and suffered fits of rage. 
His first wife, Wanda Hendrix, even went so far to claim Murphy had held her at gunpoint. In 
later life, Murphy became a pioneering crusader for the welfare of veterans who suffered from 
“Battle Fatigue”, now more commonly known as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, or PTSD.6 
     These are just samples of the thousands of men who fought in the Colmar Pocket. 
Though their efforts there go largely unnoticed, their efforts to rid the world of tyranny do not, 
and maybe that is what is important. Whatever the circumstance, they need not be forgotten.
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